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The leiiicai meaning of incommensui''abi i i ty is generally given 
as having no common basis for comparison . However m 
Philosophy of Science the term incommensurability is being 
used in the conte,;t of scientific theories that do not share 
meaning and hence they consequently can not be compared. A 
change of e bheory necessitates a change m meaning of 
scientific terms that is, the sense of a term depends upon 
the theory in which that term occurs. In other words the 
meaning of a term is primariLy theory laden. 
The term incommensurability is however o;;tendable to other 
areas such a^'j culture, value system etc. Many social 
scientists held this vjew that one civi1izatlon/culture is 
no way better than other one. There is no common ingredients 
3n mating comparison between two oi" more competing cultures 
or civilizations'^. Nevertheless our concern in this 
dissertation is to undes stand the nation of 
3 ncommensurabi 11 tv in the CDnte;;t of science. 
The notion of incommensurability was first introduced by 
Thomas I-uhn"" and by Paul Feyerabend independently that 
scientific theories are incommensurable l^ eeping m view the 
historiccal development of Science- However, the scope of 
the notion of incommensurability is martedly different in 
the writing of I uhn and Feyerabend. 
!• uhn holds that change of meaning of scientific term occurs 
where there is a shift in paradigm while Feyerabend holds 
that the meanang change surely occurs when there is & shift 
jn theory. 
Many Fhilosophers of science consider that the term 
incommensurability, in both ^uhn's and Feyerabend's worl-, is 
used in different senses but in our view, the sense of 
3 ncommensur'abi 11 ty is the same, however they differin scope, 
Feyerabend 3S so radical that he holds that scientific 
theories &re necessat^ily incommensurable. h uhn s position 
with respect to notion of incommensurability seems moderate 
in comparison to Feyerabend. In this dissertation we shall 
mainly focus on l-uhn's position. 
Mow we shall shed light on the two major approaches to the 
problem of incommensurability,, 
a)„ Logical positivists hold that the meaning of a 
scientific term remains constant across the scieritific 
theories. For them the change 3n a theory does nob impljcate 
a change in meaning of scientific terms. 
Firstly, the scientific terms share the same meaning if bhey 
occur m many scientific theories or paradigms. In other 
words the meaning of a scientific term is fiued arid 
commensurable and does not change with a change of a theory 
thay argue, for a meaningful comparisori of competing 
scientific theoi-les that the meaning of scientific term 
remains the same in theory shifts If a scientific theory 
acquires a different meaning in diffef'ent theories then it 
would not be possible to compare scientific theories and 
:.ris]s of theory choice may not be avoided. In order to 
elemmate such a possibility the logical positivists insist 
on the doctrane that the meaning of scientific terms is 
mvarian t. 
Secondly, logical positivists argue that growth of 
scientific enterprise or progress m science should be 
understood only in terms of evolution of science. In 
additiori, the progress of science may only be characterized 
in term of ability of a scientific theory m resolving 
scieritific problems- For logica] positivists, it is 
ne^cessary to i eep the meaning of scientific terms intact m 
order to appreciate the proper role a scientific theory 
plays m tact ling scientific issues. 
The logical positivists approach about commensurabi1ity 
seems to be compatible with their view about the nature of 
scientxfjc 1-nowledge and its progress. They consider 
scientific knowledge as sccummuletive and evolutionary over 
a period of time.They observe that accummulation of 
knowledge may not have sense if the meaning of a scientific 
term does not remain constant during a change of scientific 
theorles. 
b). Now we consider the tradition of new philosophy of 
science which has been emerged as a major alternative to the 
logical positivism which basically relies upon a study of 
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the history of science. Scientific episodes &rB being 
understood by these philosophers as paradigm cases fot-
establishing that the scientific progress is characterized 
by radical meaning variance. 
They reject the fundamental assumption of positivism that 
meaning remains constant from theory to theory. In other 
word<~', the meaning of a scientific term changes with a 
change in scientific theory or a theory is being modified or 
rc-placed by another theory m which that terms occur. i-uhn 
argues that the meaning of scientific berm such as 'mass', 
'velocaty', 'mumentum' etc., are having distinct meaning in 
classical Newtonian Physics and Einstein's mechanics. For 
e;;smple the mass' is absolute in classical mechanics while 
' maiss' IS relative in latter case. 
In the light of the above e;;planation the meaning of a term 
in a theoi-^ y is supposed to be entirely dependent upon that 
the^ ory. 
According to Feyerabend, the description of every single 
fact 3 5 dependent on some theory. The meaning of every term 
we use depends upon the theoretical framewort m which it 
occurs^ Words do not mean something in 3 sol at ion, they 
attain their meaning by being a part of theor^etical system. 
Moreover, when a new theory emerges to replace the old one 
the terms involved m that theory will change in such a way 
that there will be an elimination of the old meaning and the 
same term, although employed in both cases, will e5;press two 
different and incommensurable concepts^ 
The thought that theories arB incommensurable is the thought 
that theories simply cannot be compared and consequently 
there cannot be any rationally justifiable thinking that one 
theory is belter than another. The problem is supposed to be 
that, sjnce theories are incommensurable we cannot justify a 
preference for one over the other. However if theories are 
genuinely incommensurable why one should be faced the 
pr Dblem of choosing between them"' 
Lauden's proposal of problem solving effectiveness of a 
scientific theory mriy be regai^ ded as a criterion for theory 
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choice . Similarly, Arthur Fine s proposal that the facts of 
refef^ence may determine the meaning of scientific terms is 
worth mentioninq . 
According to !• uhn, the prevelent normal scientific tradition 
which 15 not capable to cope with e;;i5txng anomalies demands 
a scientific ^'evDlut30^ which is not only incompatible but 
often incommensurable with e M S t i n g theories. 
In his bool- The Structure of Scientific Revolutaon, I- uhn 
cortinues to hold that the languaqe of theories lile 
classical mechanics and Phlogiston chemistry are 
untranslatable into the conceptual scheme that replaced them 
those of special relativity and of 0;;ygen chemistry. The 
inference seems to be that the problem of incommensurability 
m its turn a p^'ablem of non-translatibi 1 ity» 
l-uhn's approach is that meaning /ariance, conceptual change 
and conceptual growth are parts and parcel of the scientific 
enterprise and concludes that scientific change is 
r'e/olut lonary m nature. 
So in the light of tuhn s wort and its subsequent 
receptions, two scientific paradigms at- conceptual 
f^^^imeworl•s may be said to be incommensurable if there is no 
adequate translation from the language of one into the 
8 
language of thie other. The shift in a scientific paradigm is 
the ma in cause for meaning change. In view of two di<3tinul 
approaches about mcommensufabi1ity, our aim is to evaluate 
and analyse the plausibility of the notion of 
mcommensurabi 13 ty. 
However, a systematic appraisal of historical development of 
philosophy of science would be useful in order to see the 
ppobJem in correct perspective. The ne,;t chapter provides 
such an appraisal. 
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CHAPTER II 
LOGICAL POSITIVISTS APPROACH TO SCIENCE 
CHAPTER II 
LOGICAL PQSITIVISTS ftPPROACH TO SCIENCE 
To understand i-uhn s Notion of incommensurability and where 
the strength of his argument lies, it is necessary to 
understnd the tradition in philosophy of science out of 
which his view has emercjed. It is the purpose of this 
chapter and the following chapters to e;jplore the bac^ ground 
issues relevant in evaluating the notion of 
3 ncommensurabi11ty. 
There are two aspects of scientific theories that are of 
primary importance in any discussion of incommensurability. 
Our goal is to explain how competing scientific theories may 
be objectively compared, that IB explaining in what sense a 
scientific l^nuwledge has an objective basis, and ejiplaining 
what sort of objective measures might be used for <« 
comparison of contemporary theories. This is an issue 
concerning the epistemology of science. Thef^ e is also a 
cumpijrative tasi- e-cplaining how the e;;pression of theories 
and their results may be correlated with one anotlser^ . This 
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is an issue concerning the lancjuage of science. Philosophers 
of science of logical posjtivisb tradibion mamtajned that 
the epicvtemic status of scientific theories was dependent on 
the epistemic status of observational statements i„e» 
statements confcaininQ observational terms. Moreover there is 
assumption that the epistemic status of observation 
statements was unproblematic. 11 Kuhn has disagreement wtth 
this V 3 t-^w about the epistemic status of scientific theories, 
it 3S that he challenges this assumption., These philosophers 
of science had first attempted to analyse the meaning of 
theoretical terms by e.splicit definitions m observational 
terms. When this method failed, related approaches were 
attempted such as Bridgman's operational ism, also with ttie 
little success. The philosopher's conceded that there was a 
move to the meaning of the language of a theory by a set of 
e,>pli.cit definitions. Posi 13 v ist>:; tool- as Dasic to their 
worl m philosophy of science, the scieritific theory as an 
aPsti-^ act entity. The theory was conceived primarily as a set 
of universal gener al i:::ation, a; loms and theoram^ with 
predictjve deductions, i-unn and his contemporaries too!-, as 
basic to their wor'k jn phi ln=iOphy of science, the scientafit 
paradigm as a social structure. The scientific community was 
viewed primarily as a group of individuals tied tocjether by 
a shared interest in certain problems and shared agreement 
about certain solutions. The basic difference between the 
po&itiv3st's thought and !• uhn' s thought is about the 
difference in scientific perspective. 
Pcsitivists thought that what was most important about the 
lanuage of snence could be discu^^sed through talk about 
ejsplicit def I riit lOfis. I-uhn maintains that what is most 
important about the language of science is that which 
escapes e,;plicit definitions. F'osit i vists seem to thiinl- thai 
the most important parts of the epistemology of science can 
be analysed by a set of logical relations. I-uhn, on the 
other hand, views the epistemology of science as a conte;;! 
dependent matter to be determined by standards shared by 
scientific community. There are differences which are 
ci^ ucial for an understandirig of i'uiin's ncition of science. 
Rtdolf Carnap is the most important representative of 
logical posi t Lvi^ -^ m. His view about the nature of science is 
most important which he labelled Sctentific Empiricism. 
Carnaps Phjloirophy of science wa? tne best !• nown and is the 
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riQoroasiy wort-ed out. We shall also consider alternative 
Dositi'/isc appfL-acnes to Philosophy of science but not m 
detai1. 
Larnap on tha Nature of Theories and brnpiricaI Meaning; 
In 19 35 we find Carnap, m The Rejection of Metaphysics 
iTiril-inc) the followmQ methodoloyxcal claim about one of t ht? 
tas!s of philosophy! 
The function of logical analysis is to 
analyse all I-ncwiedge, all assertions of 
science and of avp^r),'' day life,, In order 
\-a fifial-e clear the ss-^ nse of each such 
as=vertiun and the connections bel'^ e^en 
them,, One of the principal tast of the 
logical anal/sis of a giveii statement is 
to find out the method of verification 
for^  bhat statement. The question is, what 
reasons c^n there? be to assert this 
statt-^ men Ls, or. How can we become certain 
as to its truth oi" faJsrhood"' This 
question is called by the Philosophers 
t h e c^pi steiTiolocj i c a I q u e s t i o n , 
£--p j-Bi-eific; I uyy Qi t h e p ' l i iL 's .oph icaJ ttiooi v 
OT I now Lt-iJtje' i i. nrnth inc j o t h e r th.^ri a 
r>pt2C3ai pat t o f J o q i c a l anc?Jv=.3~, . 
r h i ' _ a u B i t i o r i T>: =An gt iod t - ' p u > i f c i o n o r if-.D apprO'--tch .^ncl tht.^ 
i o c u r , c/f •=•: l e n 11 f ] c. empi r i c 3 H=m,. Ihn 1 i r i , t t h i r u j O:, t o ih^^e 
13 t in? nopfc thC't i.>5Mi3p e; pi >-•> 3~.€;=, " o r l o c j i c i ^ l f*nri j > c j "•=•. 
I:.p L=-teii iDlag V i t s e l f l i suppo<B.t_'d t o hs-. r i o t h i n o o t h t r ' hari 
s r i a l y d r i L j cc^ r ' t ^ i r i f t r i t u r e - - -sboul t h e l o i - j i C i d r t r u c f c u i e of 
= I j t e i n e r i t s '.irid Lh£ Joc^ i i ie i f f - 3 n M o n B tht. i t o b t a i n aifirsrn, 
r I a l e m e r i t i , Cai n:*p <-.ee% ^ :> igr i i r i c - i n L r o l e f o r t h e i ne thoJ CM' 
, 6;i'I. f J Co t i o n feu :\ =, t ^ tement „ I'Jhnt i= impJie-'d her t . ' , J = h i L 
b£.-]3€'f t h a t wp r a n n D l l".c\'(- .-^  r i^aiion +•"! .\'=%e-i- !" a ^f ta I r -mrn t 
t t c j l i ' - ^ n o t --.f J 1 ] a l j LGK T h t i j ;: t he rui i i i , r^t Cdirnap t-fut ! „ 
I h u s we m-\Y Sa, + h i ^ inucri -it 'OUt t h e ep i - . t p f i i u layy o f £'i. l o n c t ' 
^.••ccDrdinci t o s c i e n t i f i c pn.p 11 i t i s r j i : a IH-C es <i:,ary c o n d i t ] cni 
f o r a ' 5 l abemen t =, b(£'jnq an n | . ] e c t L , e I ncjw J f-duiL- cL^^im i s t h a t 
. I be vei i f jc tb ic-?. T h i s p o m l rn.'edf> t o b<-j '-.Aroi.nHd bfn viu e., 
w h j l i - ' ph3 lor,oph(-.n'-, -II y ut-^i ierr i l 1 ,>. -^amj I l a r wj i n t h t 
P O = : i t i v 3 : = t ,t--n 1 f I Cc"-<t Lon thfc. '_j i , , j t L<;> qene i a3 I y v 3 t_'W(-.cl ixu 
cm 1 y a p o i n t a b o u t t h e m o a n i n g ai i^ t e r m or > - U i t e m e n t . iJh,At 
.•• eaH iJs (jvo," iDoi ed i t i h a t , a ( . c o r d j n c j t o scxe-n^-j TJ <-
ir 
e-iTip 1 r i c 1 sm „ a statement thst 3=-, not verifiable is one that 
v--:^- cuuLi not have a res&on to be->lieve. 
The theory of verifacation also bearc in the obvious in^ay on 
the lariQuage of science,, In order to I now how to correlate 
t''pre'Ssion= of a theory and jt lesuits, we must h^ve an 
Bi-iA\ys-\^ for tiie m'-anjng of s-.ta tements in a theory, VAUS tho 
problem oi ver j f icat j ori, and e'Efcablishino a frit«-iion of 
verification is s tvitral to the scientific empiricist 
-ippr.-jach to the notior. of i ncommentjarabi 111 y„ As the title., 
Tho Ro J eel ion oi Hebapnysj ci^  suggestsH, Carnap wants, among 
othei" (hinqs, to <-3how thcst nil so called metaphysical 
-tatemenb'? are not verifiable and hence cannot have any 
claim to Inowledge. Carnap says m this ways 
It will call metaphysical all those 
r-, tatementi> which claim to represent 
l-nowledge about something which is over 
or beyond all eMperienceH e.g.. about the 
real essersce of things, about things in 
themselves, the absolute and such lil'S'". 
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Thus one problem that Carnap and other poBitxvisLs faced was 
tliat it was forever a test of proposed verification ciuteria 
whether or not statements such as those mentioned by Carnap 
i^ bovB turned out to be verifaaJDle. It was not enough to 
understand the nature of scjence, metaphysics had to be 
ruled out also. There Wcis a general agreement that mere 
observational reports were empirically meanangful and 
unproblematic. The problem was to show how scientific 
theories, which made I'eference to unobservable entities, had 
significance m a way in which other disciplines such as 
i-^ eliQion Qi- speculative metaphysics whjch made reference to 
unobservable entities, did not have significance. 
Carnap's initial view may be summai-'U'ed as: 
He considers the observational language bo be a set of 
phenomenological repor^ts about one's present sensation 
slates. The theoretical language includes a set of 
mathematical and logical principles (meaningful because they 
ar^ e analytic) and a set of theoretical generalizations will 
be empirically meaningfuJ if and only if truth conditions 
for those generalizations can be ejtplicitly given in the 
17 
ofa&ervation language by means of correspondence rules that 
connect theoretical statementfe with observational 
statements. 
First, if the observational language is characterized as a 
lariQuage of, sensation, then it becomes essentially private. 
Intel sub jective discourse becomes impo^ Hisible and 3t is 
coincidence that we all speat- the same language, if we 
infact do, Carnap thus abandoris the phenomenc\l approach to 
the observ-atiunal Janguage what he calls a physical ist 
approach.The observational language is characterized m 
!-f.u->ms of readily observable properties of ordinary, physical 
object. Carnap s usual form of an observational statement is 
then F (a,b,c,d) where B^b and c are spatiat coordinates, d 
IS a measure of time and F is some observable property say 
red. This statement would then be read as At tinie d, 
location a,L,c is red. 
Sescorid, 3f truth codjtions for every theoretical statement 
can be given in terms of the obsevation statements, it is 
dj ffxcult to see what purpose the theory serves. If the 
entire theory could be restructured in terms of its 
8 
observational equivalent, then that set of observational 
btiitements could serve as a prediction of future 
observatiofis. The theory itself sfems superfluous and 
dispensable. 
Finally, Carnap reali:zes that not all theoretical terms are 
amenable to the sort of e,>plicit definition he initiallv 
requires. First, any universally quantified statement ha=-> an 
infinite number of observational consequences, and hencu 
does not have a finitely statable observational equivalent. 
But furthermore, dispositional terms present a special 
pi'oblem. Consider a defjnilxon of a term lil-e "Soluble" 
I.e.'.; IS soluble. 1% equivalent tos If ;; is placed m 
water then ,i dsssolves seems inadequate, because an ob lect 
never placed m water would be soluble according to thi'ji 
definitio,T and this is not what we mean by soluble. Other 
attempts to provide an explicit definition for "soluble" 
prove equally inadequate, Thius Carnap concludeus that there 
ar^ e certain theoretical terms, in paricular dispositional 
termu whjch can only be partially defined. The early view of 
logical positivists is still instructive because it provides 
a yundeline for basic analysis that all subsequent accounts 
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m the pnsitivist tradition woald try to follow. A theory is 
to be djvided into two parts, its set of theoretical laws on 
the one hand, and its obcervatlonal consequences on the 
other hand. These are to be related by connectmci pr^mcipler 
which define the theoretical terms in observatma] terms„ 
Furthermore, if we tal-e observaLion statements to be m some 
veridical, then the observatior.al consequences of the theory 
provide some measure of cor^reapondence to the truth for the 
theory. Thui:- Carnap's early view provider some guidelines 
about discussing the epistemology of science. Theoretical 
statements w3thout observational import are to be shunned as 
not meeting the requirement for being a claiffi to 1-nowledge, 
if there as to be one, is in terms of predictive 
consequences of two theoric-js share an observation language, 
than the observation language can mediate to allow 
comparison of theoretjal terms. It may even be that certim 
terms, lil-e "mass" or "velocity", will be defined in the 
same wa> m different theories allowing a direct comparison. 
:'j 
In "Testability and MearanQ" Carnap develops his rBVi sed 
cfutenon. He say^ -s 
Tho connection between meaning and 
confirmation has Bometifne=> been 
formulated by the the<5is that a sentence 
IS meaningful if and only 3f it i=> 
verifiable and that its meaning is the 
method of its verification. But from our 
Dresent point of view, this formulation 
although acceptable as a first 
c:tppro;iimation is not quite correct. But 
its ovEr simplification, it led to a too 
narrow restriction of scientific 
langu^ 'ige, e; eluding not only metaphysical 
sentences but also cei-^ tain scientific 
sentences having factual meaning'"'. 
Carnap defines empirical meaning entirely m tei--^ms of 
confirmation. Confirmation is defined as follows: 
:i ! 
^ sentence S is called confirmable,„.„ If 
the confirmation of S is reducable to 
that of a class of obsei'vabie predicates 
..... A predJ cate P is called 
conf j.rmab i,e„ . » . if F" is reducible . „ . . to 
4 
a class of observable predicates . 
Now let us lool- at Carnap's definstion of empirical meanings 
Requirement of Confirmabi1ity (RC): Every synthetic sentence 
must be conf3rmable". Carnap says of this requirement, 
RC ..... Suf-fices to e;;clude all 
sentences of a nun-empirical nature, 
e.Q., those of transcendental metaphysics 
m as much as they are not corifirmable, 
not even 3 ncompletely^ Thej-efore it seems 
to me that RC suffices as a formulation 
of the principle of empiricism? In other 
words, if a scientist chooses any 
language fiilfill^ng this requirenient no 
objerticiri can be raised against this 
choice from the point of view of 
emp3 ricism ., 
The problem of distinguishing observationei and theDretical 
aspects af language will be of pi-imary impor'tance. So 1st us 
consider how Carnap accounts for this distinction m order 
to establish the notion of confirmation which supports such 
a powerful conciu53on» What Carnap offers it- an eisplanation: 
A predicate "F" of a language L is called 
obser\ab]e for an organism fe.g= a 
person) N, if, for suitable arguments 
e.g. "b", N is able under suitable 
circumstances to come to a decision with 
the help of few obser/ataons about a full 
i:i->ntence say F'(ta) ' i.e. to a 
confirmation of either 'P(b)' or '"" 
P<b;'^ '.. 
However Carnap says noth3n9 about the force of the word 
"suitable" in this characterir.at3 on, nor does he sa> any 
thing about how many observations make up the decision 
process that results in a confirmation. 
Larnap is awai e of these short comingss 
Cuppose a sentence "S" is qiven, some 
test observations for it have been made 
and "S" IS cunfirmed by them in a certain 
deyree. Then it is a matter of practical 
decision whether we wjll consider that 
degree as high enough for our acceptance 
of 5„ There is no general rule to 
determine ou^ ' decision. Thus the 
acceptance and the {-"ejection of a 
I's/nthetic) sentence always contains a 
S 
conventional component . 
Moreover Carnap tal! s about e.-.'planation of observation 
itself; 
This explanation is necessarily vague. 
There is no sharp] m e between observable 
and non-observable predicates because a 
person will be more or less able to 
decide a certain sentence quicMy i.e. he 
will be inclined after a certain peruod 
9 
of observation to acceot the sentence « 
This cnsractennebion will not oe sufficient to reject 
mebaphysics if observation is a matter of convention. Tnere 
could certaml/ be a communit> of language L(sers that would 
adopt the convention of considerinq certain sentences we 
regard as highly speculative, highly confirmed after a few 
ohservations. For e-sample, a group of indiv'idual might sep 
the hand of God m everything around them and thus conclude 
aftei" a ft?w obser v'at ions that God exists. Thus for this 
language group "Bod e.ists" would be a highly conftr^med, 
empirjcally mean^ngfi^l statement according to Carnap's own 
View despite the fact that bhisis precisely the sort of 
pr'oposition that Carnap wishei.^  to reject as metaphysical and 
mean 3 ngless., 
HencB, Carnap has in no way aadressed the episteraic status 
of observation terms= It js clear from the structure of 
science he- proposes that the epistemic status of theoi-ies 
Will depend on the epistemic status of observation 
statements used in the definition and predictions of the 
theory- As he thought tiiat his doctrine i.e., observational 
statements have an unpr'oblemat ic objective basis was 
suffjcient for the rejection of metaphysics but we may 
conclude that thss remains an assumption on Carnap's part. 
The Later Phase of Carnap 
In the methodological charac tei- of theoretical concept 
Carnap attempts to provide a revised and weakened criterion 
for, what he here calls cognitive significance because he 
viewed Re (Requirement of conf irmata i 1 ity) a'^  too strong 
requirement that even ruled out some of the proposition of 
science that he thought should properly be considered as 
m&:i.in Lng f ul. 
Tl-ie basic structure of Carnap's system is still much the 
same. He still disbinguishes, withm a given language L, 
between the theoretical language Lj, and the observational 
Language Lg« These two parts of L are connected by 
ccrrespondence rules (or simply C- rules) which provide 
definitions and partial definition for the theoretical terms 
in terms of the observation language. 
Bridoman's Operationism: 
Carnap never developed a rigorous account 
of observation, nor did he seem to thinl-
that such an account was necessaf-y» Thus 
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at the out set of "The MethodoloQical 
Character of Theoretical Concepts^" we 
find Carnap sa/ing, "I shall leave aside 
the problem of a criterion of 
signifacance for the observ-ation 
lariQuage, because there seem to be hardly 
any points of serious disagreement among 
ph 1 IriSDphers today 
Most FhiloBophers m the pasitivist tradition seemed to 
agree with Carnap m this respect; there were few attempts 
to say anything more rigorous about observation than i*jhat 
Carnap had offered, one notable exception was the 
oper^atinnist tradition, first e-pounded by the physicist 
P.W. Bridgman m The Logic of Modern Physicsu Operation asm 
was not a position opposed to Carnap. Rather, ib was an 
itltedipt to explore more seriously the relation between a 
theory and the data it purports to eisplam, and an attempt 
to offer a slightly different account of empirical meaning. 
Bridgman toot the basic linguistic units empirical meaning 
to be predicates, not senbenses, and this has a weai-ening 
effect on the criterion (as noted earlier). However Bridgman 
BIJII hoped to give tlieoretical terms some I m d of complete 
definition. Complete definition was a stronger requirement 
than the positsvists account™ 
The basic opsj-'ationiii t's thesis is that a theoretical term 
IS to be delined as the set of measurement operations which 
must bt) performed m order to make a judgement ascribing 
that term to some object ar system. 
Tnra Bridgman offers as an example for the concept of length: 
We may illustrate by considering the 
concept of length. What do we mean by the 
length of an object"' We evsdently t now 
what we mean by length if we can tell 
what the length of any and ever^ y physical 
object IS and for the physicist nothing 
more is required. To fuid the length of 
an object, we have to perform certain 
physical operations. The concept of 
length js therefore futed when the 
operations by which length is measured 
ai-e fi;;ed that is, the concept of length 
involves as much as and nothing more than 
a set of operations 
m 
Thus length is synonymous with a set of measuring CDperations 
which produce a measurement of length, and for length to be 
an empirically meaningful concept there must be such an 
operational definition. In general, Bridgman says: 
The concept is synonymous with the 
correspondinq set of operations. If the 
concept is physical, as of length, the 
operations are actual physical 
operations, namely, thoseby which length 
is measured, or if the concept is mental, 
namely those by which we determine 
whether a given aggregate of magnitude is 
12 
continuous 
There are several advantages to this approach. First, 
Bridgman does not need to distinguish between the analytic 
meaning of mathematics and logic, and the empirical meaning 
of science, as Carnap does. Rather, all of these are 
operationally meaningful, only the mechanism of the 
operations may differ. Second, Bridgman implicitly provides 
a more comprehensive account of observation. A observation 
report is the report of the result of performing some 
operations, reading the scale on a balance, counting the 
:<? 
lines on a spectograph and so on. There is still a 
ambiguity, because operation ism says little about vJhat 
counts as a physical operation. There may be several ways to 
measure what we generally regard as the same property. Thus 
wp may tafe a measuring rod, and by laying it to end to end, 
detei^mine the length of some object- But we may use a 
totally different proceduie for determining length. Using a 
spectroscope we might determine the velocity of the object 
fiom its reu shift, measure the amount of time it takes the 
object to pass a particular point, and use these to 
calculate its length. Both these procedures ars legitimate 
calculation of something that is "length" and yet the 
procedures have nothing m CDmmon. Thus Bridgmesn says: 
In principle the operations by which 
length is measured should be uniquely 
specified. If we have more than one set 
of operations, we have more than one 
concept, and strictly there should be a 
separate name to correspond to each 
different set of operations ". 
According to Bridgman, each unique set of operations is 
synonymous with a different concept. In other words, there 
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are ne/er two different ways of measuring the same property. 
This IS not an easily acceptable determined way of 
measuring. We intend to thjnl that length 3s one single 
property of an object, regardless of how it is measured, or 
at least to thml- that there is more than one way to measure 
length. Furthermore, the assumption seems to be crucial to 
scientists. It is by cof'roboration between different means 
o-f mea'auring a single property that scientists often gain 
the most useful information about the accuracy of measuring 
devices. 
Another consequence of the operationist insistence on strict 
synonomy between concept and operation is that an object 
does not possess a cerxairi property at any time when the 
operation whsch measures that property is not being 
performed. As Cai-^l Hempel has pointed out, we thm^ that 
abject have mass, for example, even at times when we are not 
meesur'ing their mass. However; 
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An operational definition of a concept 
will hav(? to be unaer&tood as ascribing 
the concept to all those cases that would 
e,\'hib2t the rharacieristic response if 
the test conditions should be realized- A 
concept thus characterised is clearly not 
synonymous with the co^ 're'=pondlnQ set of 
operation 
If the operatlonists wish to maintain the thesis of strict 
^ynonomy, then we can not say that an object has mass when 
we are not measuring its mass. But the requirement of 
synonomy is one th.-tt Bridginan, seems unwHiirrg to give up 
and it 15 ono of the pi-inc3pal differences between 
operationism and other posativjst account of empirical 
[fieaning, 
Hempel's Philosophy of Science 
Cai-^1 Hempel s own views on empirical meaning began to 
diverge from Cai-^ nap s in the fifties, at about the time 
Carnap published "The Methodological Character of 
Theoretical Concepts". 
Hempel offered the most liberal requirements for eflipirjcal 
meaning. Hempel reasons that once we accept that we can not 
have a sy&teiTi of euplicit definitian&, operatjonal or 
otherwise that give obaerva bional intei''pretatn3n to the 
theoretical language, then there i<5 no reason to re^ sti ict 
ourselves to Carnap type reduction sentences which provide 
interpretation for the sentences and predicates of the 
theoretical language individually and jtern by time. Hempel 
says! 
A partial specification of the meaning of 
a set of nonobservat3onal terms might be 
e-;pressed, mof^ e generally, by one or more 
sentences that, connect those terms with 
the observational vocabulary but do not 
have the im-m of reduction sentences. And 
it seems well to countenance, for the 
same purpose, even stipulation expressed 
by sentences containing only 
nonobservational terms, for e,;ample, the 
stipulation that two theoretical concepts 
are mutually exclusive may be regarded as 
a limitation and in this sense, a partial 
15 
specification of their meaning 
Hempel argues here that sentences m the theoretical 
language do not necessarily get their interpretations in 
isolation and independent of orie another. The interpretation 
ui some sentences or predicate may oe affected by a whole 
group of sentences, even a group of sentences that are 
themselves entirely nonobservatlonal« Thus Hempel 
recommendss 
Generally, then, a set of one or more 
theoretical terms, t^, to -t^ might 
be introduced by any set H of sentences 
such that (i) li contains no extra logical 
terms otiier than t| , t2 t,-, and 
observation terms (ii) M is logically 
consistent and <iii) M is not equivalent 
to a truth of formal logic ..... A set M 
of this i-ind will be referred to briefly 
as an interpretive system, its elements 
as interpretive sentences 
From this passage we see that Hempel advocates a view on 
which the interpretation of a theory is an interrelated 
whole and thus questions of empirical meaning for particular 
:.4 
oredicates or for particular sentences make no sense. We can 
only as "does the theory as a whole have empirical meaninQ"'" 
It IS interestirtQ to note that this sort of holistic 
approach to the meaning of theories is most frequently 
attributed to I-uhn„ It is not a view that scientific 
empiricists advocated happily, but one that Hempel at least 
was willing to accept. Hempel points out another, 
consequence of his views 
There remains no satisfactory general way 
of dividing all conceivable systems of 
theoretical terms into two classes; those 
that ai-e scientifically significant and 
ihose that are riot, those that have 
experimental import and those that lact 
it. Rather, e;!perimentai oi'^  operational, 
significance appears as capable of 
17 gradation^; 
Hempel maintains that the goal of scientific empiricism is 
to provide a way determirung the empirical significance of a 
theory. He is also aware, that he can not fule out theories 
which include some metaphysical statements as being 
..D : 
meaningfui, since meaning is no longer assigned statement by 
1S 
statement » However, this was not an acceptable position 
for many positivisbs. 
F'.eichenbacli on Probability and Meaning 
Hans Reichenbach's analysis of empirical significance is 
quite similar to Carnap's position. There are two mam 
differences. First, Reichenach mal-es an e;>plicit appeal to 
probability in his account of empirica] significance. What 
Reichenbach calls weight is very much lii-e Carnap's notion 
of confirmation, but Reichenbach is very dire^ 'ct about its 
probabilistic natui^ e and the importance of probability for 
empirical significance. 
Second, Reichenbach differs with Carnap significantly on his 
views about the foundations of probability. Discussion of 
tins second point is not important here, but the first point 
merits some consideration. 
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Fexchenbach first cansiders a position which was 
characteristic of early positivism. Itis based on the 
following two principless 
1. A proposition has meaning if and only if it i3 
verifiable as true or false« 
2. Two propositions have the ^ame meanincj if they obtain 
the same determination as true or false by every 
19 possible observation 
These requirements amount to a requirement of complete 
ve3r3 f labi 1 i ty, i.e., there must; be some set of possible 
observations that would conclusively demonstrate the truth 
or faslsity of the proposition. These requirements also 
result in a clc<im very similar to operatlonism. 
Re-ichenbach does not endorse this view, but he tai-es it as a 
starting point to develop his own position. Ho worries first 
about the notion of possibx 1,1 ty expressed m the above 
principles. He. considers two possible interpretations, that 
o'^  log icaL possibility, and that of physical possibility. 
Thus, for e;;ample, to construct a bridge acf-'oss the Atlantic 
IS phiysically possible, butit is nob possible to construct a 
perpebusl motion machine, even though this is logically 
possible. To interpret "possibi1xby" as physical possibility 
seems, according to Reichenbach, too restrictive, because 
certain seenongly meaningful sentences would turn out to be 
meaninglesss 
Tal-e a sentence concerning the interior 
of the sun; that there are forty million 
degrees of heat an the sun's center 
cannot be verified because it is 
physically impossible to introduce an 
instrument of measurement into the sun's 
20 bull , 
On the other hand, to interpret "possible" as logically 
possible seems to offer too broad an interpretation. It is 
iLsgjcaJly pD!»sible bhat any number of things might be 
observable. 
Reichenbach s response is to maintain the physical 
interpretation of possibiliby, but to introduce indirectly 
ve^ 'lf table, as well as directly verifiable propositions. 
:.s '. 
Reichenbach notes that directly verifiable pi-^opositions 
will, be observation pfopositions, while indirectly 
verifiable propositions will generally be the theorebical 
claims of science. Reichenbach first proposes that £i 
phoposition 3s indirectly verifiable if its truth conditions 
are equivalent to a class of directly verifiable 
propositions. ^his suggestion is ^^ery similar to Carnap s 
stand at the time of the Vienna Circle. Reichenbach noteia 
that the equivalence class for indirect propositions will 
otten be an infinite set of propositions. It becomes a 
practical impossibility bo actually v'erify an indirect 
proposition, since we are incapable of verifying an infinite 
spt of directly verifiable propositions. 
Reichenbach s resolution is to note that the theoretical 
principle is probable, given the observations. Thus 
Reichenbach offers the following principles as the fmaJ 
version of his position: 
•:9 
First principle of the prDbabilit/ theory 
cl meaning; a proposition has meaning if 
it IE possible to determine e weight. 
I.e. a degree of probability, for the 
proposition ... Second principle of the 
pr'-obatai 1 ity theory of meaninCfS two 
sentences have the same meanj.nQ if they 
obtain the same weight, or degree of 
probabiljty, by every possible 
21 
ohservation 
The difficulties with Reichenbach's account are similar to 
those with Larnap s. We need an dccount of what observation 
is, Slid that account is problissmat J c. Reichenbach on this 
point is mure strict that Carnap. He insists on a 
phenomenoloyjcal account of observation, largely because he 
for-sees the sort of difficulties that Carnap's account of 
observation must face. 
Ryichenbach considers how we ai'^e to distinguish 
observational statements from theoretical statements. He 
considers whether or not the merely technical distinction 
between general and singular statements will suffice. 
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According to Reichenbach, this will not do. 
Let us coniiidsr the Michelson e;;periment. 
Every physicist I-noi^«>^  that the statement 
ccjncerning the equality of the velocity 
of light m different directions is not 
directly obser^ved in the Michelson 
ejjperiment but that itis inferred .... 
Directly observed are images in 
telescopes or on photographic plates, or 
indications of thermometers, 
galvanometers, etc.'^ '" 
Reichenbach's concern is this: m order for observation 
statements to do the wort: they have been assigned m his 
system, they must be absolutely verifiable. But, if the 
statements we need — for e;'ample "the velocity of the speed 
of light IS observed to be equal m ail directions ait time 
"t" for ejsperipment "e" — is arrival at only 
inferrentially, then it is not absolutely verifiable. Thi-s 
seems to suggest that some more operational concept of 
obseivation would be better, but Reichenbach points out: 
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A statement concerning a physical fact, 
even if it concerns a simple fact of 
daily lite, never r-efers to a single fact 
alcne but always includes some 
predictions. If we say, "There is a table 
in my room, before my eyes, at 7.15 P.M." 
this contains the prediction ..."11 I put 
a booh: on the table, it will not drop""'"'. 
There is one other point about Reichenbach's view which 
draws our attention. Basic to his definition of meaning is a 
notion of pphysical possibility employed in defining possible 
observations. These possible observfations will be ued to 
determine whether or not, physical theories are meaningful. 
But if it IS an open question which physical theories ar& 
meaningful until they have passed the test, then it is 
difficult tc) see where the notion of physical possibility 
comes from. 
A notion of physical possibility is linked to apriori 
ph>'s.ical theory, it seems that the whole process will be 
circulars wnich physical tf->BDrxes are meaningful will be 
determined by what the physically possible observations Are^ 
« 4 "^  « 
and what the physically possible observations are i^ Jill 
depend on what the meaningful phvuical theories are. 
Naqel on Reductlonxsm 
Su far, nothing has been said about the relations bettsptjen 
two or more theories, or how one is bo choose between rivaJ 
tiieories, or when the replacement o1 one tfieory by another 
i =: rational and to be considered scientific pi uQf t'ss. 
Positivism hctd very Little to say on these questions, 
instead it addresses the rjuestjon such as "Under what 
conditions is one theory reducible to another fcheor^y '" Three 
assumptjons ars itnplaed by this questions (i) thiat when one 
Iheor^y is reducible to csnother, the change from the former 
to the latter is a rational change, and hence constxtubeL-
scientifLc progre-5s, < i x "> that such reduction actually do 
occur in the histoh^ of scierice, and >, 111; that such 
f eduction are ident i"^  j able and i-nowable in the history of 
sriense. Pusitjvjsm never questioned ariy of these 
assump bions. 
In the wor!- of Erne'-H;t Nagel we find the clearest ejjplicatxon 
of the pDSjtivist analysis of theory reduction- Naqel 
writes: 
The phenomenon of a relatively autonomous 
theory becomirig absorbed by, or reduced 
to, some other* more inclusive theory is 
an undeniable arid recurrent feature of 
the history of moder^ n ticience. There is 
every reason to suppose that such 
reduction will continue to tale place in 
24 the future 
Thus we see that Nagel simply assumes the claim that theory 
reduction is "an undenisible and recur^ent feature" in bhe 
history of science. His concern is not to lustify that this 
IS the process Ly which science progresses, but rather iii^b 
concern is to analyse an obvious teature of Ihe nastory of 
sclence. 
Magel adentifips two different ways in whicii theory 
reduction may occur% what he calls "homogeneous" and 
"heterogeneous" reduction. Homogeneous r^eduction occurs when 
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one theo ! y about a p a r t i c u l a r t v p e o f phertumen£», i s shown t o 
be.' 3 branch of a br 'oader tns 'ory about the? isame typ^? o f 
p^ler.omc•na. A c.R?,e o f theo i 'y i-^ educ 11 on is moet te^ad i l y 
j C i a n i i f i f l D i a rss homoc,enBous when thr i d f .>sc r ip t i ve p r e d i c a t t ^ s 
pmpLoyecl j n t he ^wo t h e o r i e s are e s s e n t s a i l y t h e same. Fur 
example, o d l i l e o '-. Mioory of t he f i io t ion o f f a l l m y b.>dit-5 
us^i'S the same d e s o r i p t i v t e tsTft'iSi as Nev^ion's m',.^thaiius 
( / e l f j c i l y , at ce J -:ral3 on „ d i s t a n c e , t i m e , ^.-'Lc. ) , and was 
evt-H'tU'-ill y ^^ubiLumed as e %'ibd j, V3 5j.on e f geineral Newton j an 
iTie-chaniC5„ Heter^ugerieL-ius r t ' d u c l i n occu rs vg l^en one- t h e o r y i^^ 
I-t-duced bo ^-Mluthr'^ theoi- / w^h ich cor icerns q u a l i t a t i v e l y 
d 1 t-f ££."ent -ADPts u f p h y s t c a l phenomena. l- ieterogeneous 
"6 'duc t jon 15 id ' - 'n i J f i ab l e beoaust o f , t h e da spa r i t / between 
IhL' d ' ^ s c r i p i i v e pred J oats-'S o f t he two th t -^or ies. Thus, a t ' he 
erid o f the n inej teonbh confct iry, the rmod/namics was e^^pJamed 
in terms of mechanics , de<..>ijite the f a c t t h a t " t e m p e r a t u r e " a 
thpi-mudyriaiii ic c o n c e p t , and "I-. a n e t i ' eneryy" . , a mechan ica l 
c o n c e p t , a re a p p a r e n t l y d i s p a r a t e c o n c e p t s . 
I t IS a second I-md of r e d u c t j u n Kiagel 3S i n t e r e s t e d i n . He 
c o n s i d e r s the r e d u c t i o n o f G a l i l e a n laws o f mo t i on t o 
Newton J an mechanics t o be s t r a l y h t f orwar-d and unprcb lema t i c . 
f'Jagel gi,'es a set of requirements tor heterogenaous 
i-sduction that must be met in order to establish that one 
theory is reduciblti to anothei- . Negei fjf^ st statet; thre-e 
formal conditions that must be met. He i^ ays: 
The a;;joms^  spe-ciai hypothesos, and 
e/per^imental laws of the sciences 
m-'olved in a redur'ion must be eveilable 
as r3;!pl3citly formulated statements, 
whost- various constituent terms have 
m'^anings unambiQuously fi,;ed by codified 
rules uf lisage or by established 
pr^ocedures appropriate to each 
discipline. To the extent that this 
elemeritary requiremei"it is not satisiied, 
3t js hardly possibJe to decide with 
esssur^nce whether one science ',or branch 
of science) has in fact been reduced to 
•ncr 
a n o t l i e r " 
Nagel's account of theof^ y reduction faces some problems of 
not prcividing =< complete account cjf the rationality of 
scientific change, It requires, that there be a predecessor^ 
theof y wit.'-i which to compare. Furthermore, not all 
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comparisons between theories &re between predecessor and 
sjccessor. Thet^ e are times in the history of science when 
two theories; i- 3val one another to be bhe successor to some 
older t^ plrd theory. Nsgel s account says nothing about how 
such rival theories might be compared. 
The JoQical positiv3sts c^uterl^ of meaning never succeeded 
either in eijplaining the meaning of theoreticaJ terms or 
I'uling out a class of statements, namely metaphysical, that 
icientiiic empiricists d-esired to show as not meetirsg the 
necessary conditions for abjective i-nowledge claims. In 
Of der to do so we would rrquire iioth furthes- v-evisions of 
cr^iteria of meanjng and a richer account of observation 
?.>tatements. 
The lesson is an instructive one, however. We see that some 
positivists, lite Hempei, was not necessarily oppQi,ed to 
lottirig nonempi ric^ il statements play some role in science 
when conjoined with theories that otherwise have empirical 
contcents. There is also recognition of the fact that 
theoretical terms are not and should not be dmenable to 
complete, e;;p3icit delinitjon. There is also some indication 
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tha-c both Hempel and Reichenbach had an appi'eciation for the 
hDl3&tJc aspect of the language of science. 
Thougii a detailed analysis of observ/ation statements was not 
forthcaming trom scientific empiricism, this is more tsecaust^  
there seemod to be rio need for such an analysis than because? 
(as with theorebjcal >:,tatements') such analysis proved to be 
intrai. table,, The dynamics of theory change simply was not ari 
issue. Only' Nagel =.e!-iDusly addresses the concept of 
SLientific progress, and his analysis forusses on the one 
nai-'^ Dw concept of theory reduction. 
Scientific empiricists had to accept that a full analysis of 
the meaning of theoretical tei^ ms requirea more than a set of 
6.-,;plicit definitsons. It requis-^ ed that some meaning be 
imparted implicitly. Fut-therniore, there is at least 
speculatin on the pari of some scientific empiricists that 
meaning is holistic: theoretic tet^ ns do not get the full 
meaning independent of any other theoretic terms, but rather 
that meaning is a featui-e of the theory as a whole. Tne 
meaning of observation terms is neither discussed nor a 
concern. 
>18 : 
The epir,temic staitus of <5Cientific theoh^ies according to 
scjerttLfic empirxcibm is simuly one large question mark. ft 
IS imDlicit j.n the woiH of Carnap and others, -and e;'pliCit 
]n the war! at Nagel, that how we judge the mer^t of a 
t!~ieof y will depend on the Db'=ifer v'at lonal CDn-->&qut.'nces of the 
theory. Ti"ii= vusw, however, tslis us nothing about the 
ultimate status of theDf-ier. unless we liave a view about the 
euisLoiTiic status of observation statements, Ori this latter 
point scientific empificism is simply siierit. There is at 
bt-sb an implicit assumption that obsei^vation statements 
curistitute a pcivileged cla^s that ar^ e jn some sense Self-
jtstifviny, but this position 3s never actually stated or 
ai gued for. Fui--ther, the only accoun-c of scientific, 
pi'ogi^ess, Nagel's depends entirely on the assumption that 
the observatjon lariguage is fi.ed and i-eident i f labie from 
ofiS theoi-y to the ne,t„ 
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CHAPTER III 
KUHNS RESPONSE TO LOGICAL POSITIVISM 
CHAPTER III 
I-uhn's Response to LoQ3caI PQSItivism 
Tne main goal of IcQical positivism was to demonstrate thab 
s~ience has a privileged place in our !• nowledge, a I md of 
objectivity that othei" disciplines lacl-. Thus scientific 
empiricism focuses on the differ^ence between science on the 
one hand, and metaphysics, religion, and mythology on the 
other hand,. 
The group of Philosophers thab will be under discussion in 
this chapter have a rather different goal. This group of 
phi lasophe!''S are Miown as new phiJosophers of science who 
give emphasis on the importance of historical context and do 
riot view science as privileged one as far as epistemic 
content of science is concerned. Then focus is on the 
actual history of science, and how the actual practice of 
scaentists revealis that the scientitsc enterprise is just as 
fraught with metaphysical b6.^ 1iefs, subjectivity, and human 
irrationality as any othef discipline. 
Paul Feyerafcena even goes so far as to claim that this js 
the way that science should be conducteds 
• wJ ^  > 
A scientist v^ ho is interested in ma'umal 
empirical content, and who wants to 
understnd as man> aspects of his theory 
as possible will accordingly adopt a 
pluralistic methodoJ ocjy, he will coriipare 
theories with other theories rather than 
with e!;perisnce, data or facts, and he 
will ti V bo impi-'ovD rather than discard 
the views that appear to lo.e in the 
competition. For the alternatives, which 
he needs to 1 eep Lhe contest going, may 
hv cai-on from the past as well„ As a 
matter at fact, they ma^,, be taken from 
wherever one is able to find them from 
ancient myths and niodern prejudices, frofP 
the lubrications of e;'perts and from the 
fantasies of crani-s. The whole history of 
a subject is utilised m the attempt bo 
impt^ ove its most recent end most advanced 
sLage. The separation between the history 
of a science, its ph]iosophy and the 
£cience itself dissolves into thin air 
and so does the separation between 
science and non-sciente . 
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My goal in this chapter is to identify the key issues in 
philosophy of scicsnce that leB.d I-uhn to provide a notion of 
incommensurability. Towards that end it will be necessary to 
identify what the real disputes are between logical 
positivism and new philosophers of science. Without an 
appreciation for their actual differences it will be 
impossible to understand the concept of incommensurability. 
W=j will consider here the vjews of philosophers like Paul 
Feyerabend, Thomas Kuhn and others, i^e shall be concerned 
with then'' ireament of these questions; How are theoretical 
terms defined" What js the naturae of scientific change'' 
One of the chief criticism that Fuhn and others have raised 
ficjainst logical positivism is that the empiricist picture of 
the structure of scientific theories is unrealistic? it does 
not t-eflect the way m wh]cn science is actually done. 
Rather the tasi- of conscructing an accurate picture of the 
structui'^ e of scientific theories would seem to be a 
historical one. Historians should and do contribute to our 
understanding CT the history of science. 
Philacopher attempts to offer that the scientific theoi-^ ies 
should be judgud by epistemic standards. If the philosopher 
offers such standai-ds with no regard to the actual practise 
of science, then a constraint on th« philosopher is to 
offer epistemic guidelines that a scientist actually could 
fulfill. If we are to I-now how to compare two scientific 
theories, we must i now what it is, that we are going to 
compare. 
We must have a criteria for identifying a scientific theory 
and a means of analysing it. Thus the question, "whatis the 
structure of a scientific theory", becomes not just a 
historical question but philosophical. 
The conte;ctual ists (nev'j philosophers of science) answer to 
this question differs from the answer of logical positivism. 
It differs primarily because CDnte;;tual ists have a different 
answer to the problem of definition. Scientific empiricism 
mai-es two mam assumption which characterize the sctructure 
of a scientific theory. 
First, theoi^etical terms are to be defined ultimately in 
obs6?rvational terms, and observational terms are not 
b6 
themsel^'eE in need of definitiori. This has left sceintafic 
empiricists wi tli the awkward consequence that, theoretical 
terms are not gerserally complfe^ teiy definabJe-, in other words 
definition do not e;;haust the meaning of theoretical terms. 
Second a theory is to be judged by ibs observational 
consequence's. These two assumptions suggest the traditional 
hierarchical view of scientific theoriesii a set of laws of 
the theory, stated in the tlieoret ical language, where 
theoretical terms are defined by bridge pranciples to the 
obj^ervation language, and where there ars some observational 
statements that represent the pridictions deducibie from th>-;:' 
]'-iws of theory. Con textuabion emphasis what is over looked 
b^ logical positivism. There must be more to the meaning of 
theoretical terms than what is stated m a set of partial 
definitions. The focus is on whrrit Feyerabend calls "natural 
interpretations" (-*nd what ^ uhn calJs "exemplars". To make 
these terms c3ear, it will be useful to focus on some 
particular examples tal-en from the history of science, A 
transition in the hisotry of science discussed by both 
Feyei- abend and Kuhn is the change from the ptoiemaic 
geocentric view of astronomy to the copernican heliocentric 
/is3w of astronomy. 
A more complete picture and the role of natural 
interpretation may be seen m the sctructure of a scientific 
theory tay turninQ to 1-uhn s analysis of e;!emplars. We find 
that the term "e-iemplar" comes from luhn's later writings, 
and iS an attempt on his part to clarify one of the meanings 
he associates with the term "Paradigm" in "The structure of 
Scientific Revoiution". 
I-uhn beans his explanation of e;;emplars by asking the 
question. How do scientists attatch symbolic generalization 
to nature"* !• uhn sayss 
Since the abandonment oi hope for a 
sense-datum language, the usual answer to 
this question has been in terms of 
correspondence rules. These have already 
been tai-en to be either operational 
definitions of scientific terms or else a 
set of necessary and sufficient condition 
for the term's applicability. I do not 
myself doubt that the examination ol a 
given scientific community would disclose 
» .JO 
3 numbef' cf such rules chared by its 
numbers. I do doubt that the 
corf^espondence i uie discovered m this 
May would nearly sufficierit in number or' 
force to account for the actual 
correlation between formalism and 
experiment m£^ de regularly and 
unproblemat3cally by members of the 
qt oup"". 
huhn argues here that logical positivism has offered an 
unrealistic picture of science. He holds that a theory is 
related to natural phenomena by concrete and particular 
e\amples, which he calls e)!emplars., By such examples he 
mpans e,;actly bhe sort of examples tliat Feyerabend call:3 
natural interpretations. The Ptolemaic seeing the falJing 
stone as an elucidating msbance of ptolemaic principles of 
motion, the Bali lean seeing the ship on the sea as an 
jnstance of Galilean principles of motion. Now we shall see, 
what occurs when one theory replaces another"' 
The theme of \ utm s structure of scientific revolution is to 
explain the dynamics of theory change. He provides episodes 
from history of science to show a pattern of theory change,, 
Initially thei-e is a scientific community struggling with a 
cc3mmon set of problems. Howev'er, the community has no 
Qv'erall agreement about which theory IE the correct theor>, 
and no theory among available alternatives has demonstrated 
itself capable of solving the probletru This I-uhn calls the; 
pi e-paradiqmatic stage. After a time, some theory will 
emerge that claims to solve number of I-ey problems. This 
tneory will have with it a paradigm accepted by tnose 
members of the scientific community and according to which 
that theory is the best theory. The paradigm will identify, 
among other things, bhe set of pf^oblems considered to be the 
proper domain of the theory. The theory will not solve ^11 
of them, but this will be the tas^ of scientists m the 
community to wort out the intended application of theory, 
I-uhn calls it the pei-jod of normal science. 
After sometime, certain problems will resist solution, and 
certain predictions will not work out as the theory says 
they should, Adhoc modifications may be mad to try and ma^e 
the theory acceptabJe, but as bhe number of anamolies 
incri?5ses the thec^ rv will reach a crisis stage. During a 
6V 
time of ci"isi3 rival theories will emerge and begin to 
receive serious considers f^ ion. Eventually some rival theory 
associated with a different paradigm will show itself 
capable of solving the anamolous problem, and will replace 
the older theory. 
Tins 15 what I uhn calls a scientific revolution. After such 
a revolution the new theory functions m a period of not-ma 1 
science and tlie whole process repeats itself- To understand 
this cycle, it as essential to understand what I-uhn mean^ bv 
=* paradigm. i-uhn himself is not clear on this point and 
grc'nts that there are different things that he has meant in 
differerit places. Bub in the broadt^st sense, a paradigm is a 
¥iay of viewing nature, a puint of view from which the world 
i<i seen, or a concefjtual scheme and frame work. 
Hor^eover we may identify tiiree mam functions of a paradigjn 
one majn function is to define and provide the language m 
which theory and observation will be stated by the 
srientjfic community, and to provide meaning for the terms 
of that language. Second a paradigm prov'ides guide lines for 
the application of a theory, identifying those problems that 
are the proper domain ot the theory and the direction of 
future research. Finally, a paradigm provides some of the 
scandards^ by which scientists will judge the success of the 
theory. 
However the above description is the function of a paradigm. 
lb does not tell us what a paradigm itself actually is. As 
far as the component<--, of a paradigm are concerned, 1-uhn 
sa>ss 
I shall identify three of these which, 
because central to the cugnitjve 
operation of the group, must pi.Trticulaf^ 3 y 
concern philosophers o1 science. Let me 
refer them as symbolic generalization, 
model'E and eiiemplars"'. 
ine have aJ ready discussed e,,Gmplers m some detail and we 
understand some of the role play in giving a paradiqm its 
definitjonal function. For the other two components, I-uhn 
?<ays; 
: o^ : 
Symbolic yener&lirations, in particular, 
aro those e'.pressJons, depJoyed without 
question by the group, which can h'eadily 
be cast in logical form lil-e •,;;) (y) (z) 
!;!,>,::). They are formal or the readily 
forma Livable, components of the 
disciplmaiy matri--. Models ... are what 
provide the group with preferred 
analogies oi- wheri deeply held, with an 
ontology. Ab once ertrerae they are 
heuristic: the electric circuit may 
fruitfully be regarded as a steady-state 
hydrodynamic system, or a gas behaves 
111-e a collection of microscopic billiard 
balJs m random motion. At the other, 
they are objects of metaphysical 
cummitments the hecit of a body is the 
Mnetic energy ofits constituent 
particles, or more obviously 
metaphysiceJ, ail perceptible phenomena 
are due to the motion and interaction of 
4 
qualitatively neutral atoms in the void . 
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We <bhouJd notice that disciplinary matrii? is another word 
for pai-adigm- 1-uhn says that symbolic generalisations ars 
part of a paradigm. 1-uhn does» not see theory and paradigm as 
separable entities. The paradigm is the larger whole of 
iwhich the theof y is a part. 
For logical positivism, symbolic generalisation are the most 
important part of a theory. These generalizations are 
connected to observation statement. Kuhn, while 
ari-nowledgmg the role of symbolic generalisations m a 
paradigm, says that it serve as part of the definitional 
role played by a paradigm. 
The way i-uhn uses the woi-d model, it is not clear how models 
differ from e;;emplars. One possibility is that 1-uhn tales a 
(Todel to be something more general than an eijemplar, so that 
exemplars are just one t>pe oi model. 
Fuhn begins by offering a partial Last of the sort of 
standards that scientists avail for theory choice. He says: 
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What, I ast to begin lAiith, what are the 
characteristics of a good scientific 
theory'" Anionq a number of quite usual 
answers, I select five, not because they 
are e.ihaustive, but because they are 
individually important and collectively 
sufficiently varied to indicate what is 
at stal-e. First, a theory should be 
accui-ate within its domain, that is, 
consequences deducible from a theory 
should be in demonstrated agreement with 
bhe result of e;;isting e;;periments and 
observations. Second, a theory should be 
Lonsi'sient, not only internally or with 
itself, but also with other currently 
accepted theories applicable to related 
aspects of nature, Jhj rd, it should have 
broad scope m particular, a theory's 
consequences should extend for beyond the 
particular observations, laws, or 
subtheor'ies it was mitjelly designed to 
e,plain. Fourth, and closely related, it 
3l"iOuld be simple, bringing order to 
phenomena that m its absence would be 
individually isolated and, as a set, 
confused. Fifth, a somewhat less standard 
item, but one of special important bo 
actual scientific decisions - a cheof^ y 
shouJd be fruitful of new research 
findings, it should, that is, disclose 
new phenomena or previously unnoted 
5 
c^ elat ionsh J P5 among those already I-nown . 
There js nothing privileged about the five standards Kuhn 
nentions here. This is one of his tenets that there are no 
pmvileged standards for Iheory chcace. However, these five 
arB illustrative of how a paradigm can determine standards 
of theoi'y choice., 
First, accM-^acy of predictions of a particular theory are 
not determined independent of a pafadigm., When we judge the 
accuracy of a prediction, vm arB considering two things. 
First what result does the theory tell us to e--;pect, and 
CD6 
second, how sensitive are the instruments by which the 
experimental result is being observed-
Scientists msy have some theory independent methods of 
testing his theory of measurement. Galileo used a telescope 
to male astronomical observations, but he did not have to 
i-^ely on only astronomical obset-vation to tell him how 
accurate the telescope was as a measuring device. He could, 
fai e;,ample, obser^ve the motion of ships at sea to cheCf the 
accuracy of his telescope. 
Now, when a theory is initially proposed, the model on which 
the theory is based will constr^ain beliefs about accuracy,, 
Later, as theory independent method of judging accuracy 
develop, these will have relevance only v-»here the scemtific 
community accepts certain exemplars for their tneory 
measurement. So the eisemplars and models of scientific 
community will not only determine how they judge the 
accuracy of a theor^ y, but also how they judge the importance 
of accuracy„ We can see this pattern repeated for any other 
criteria of theory choice alio. Consider consistency which 
shall also follow the same general lesson that a scientific 
a 7 
commu-iity does not adopt a.eternal standards for theorj 
choice- What c n t e r x a they use, how they judge the success 
of the theory relative to those criteriax, and how they rant 
the zmpof'tance of thosp criteria relative to one anobher 
Will depend on the models and e\emplar5 accepted by the 
scientific communit>. So the theory choice will be paradigm 
dependent. With this account of the f'Uhnian paradigm, we may 
now e;!plain m more detail the process of theory change of 
particular importance is the-.- sequence of events kuhn Sf=as as 
characteh'ist ics of a scientific i evolufcion, for it li out of 
ihis sequence of events that he sees tl-ie problem of 
Lncommensurabi 1 i"cy arising. 
The emergence of a paradiym arid the move into a period of 
normal science pfesent a different pictufSr 
By the time a theor^- has reached the crisis st;age this has 
uhanged„ After some time, certain pfoblems will resist 
solution, and certain piedictions will not worl- out as the 
theory says. Adhoc modifications may be made to try and mate 
the theory fit the data, howev-er, such adhoc modifications 
continually run the f isl- of violating the s,tandards set for 
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what CDunts as an acceptaole problem eolution. 1-uhn point = 
out that a ci-^ isis stays will emerQe. 
At the crisis stage bhe scientific community begins to 
fesembie a community m the pre-paradigmatic stage more than 
a community in a pei-iod of normal scivsnce for widening the 
standards for acceptability. The result is that the crisis 
period Will reach a stage when not only rivaJ theories, bub 
also rival paradigm, may challenge th'.e accepted theory and 
paradigm. The replacement of not just one theoi-^ y by anothef , 
but one paradigm by another, is a scientific reyolutipn. 
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KUHN'S NOTION OF INCOMMENSURABILITY 
CHAPTER IV 
KUHN'S NOTION OF INCOtltlENSURABILITY 
A ccmmon undertHtndinQ of the incommGn&urabi 11ty the-sis &ays 
th<al two differenC scientific theari.es can not be camparBdu 
But we n£?od a more e\a'-t stabement of fchi = . There B.re two 
uutstions to answer in clarifying this theses. First, what 
surts oT theories are we inti^rested in comparinu ' Second 
what =iQrt of uomparisons srB we interes^ted in siai-inq"' 
Comparability; 1 hie notion of incommensurabi 1 L Ly here dotss 
noL mc-an to mai e a comparii-on be. fcween any two theories. ''Xich 
as, a comparison between \.ociG-"h] olociy and quantum 
mechanjus. i^ e ai-o concerned mor^ €^  particularly with theorift ; 
that are aboi't the same l"opic= For s^ample we can male 
compai'ison of scientific theoi-les pi-^ opos^ ed b> Ptolwriy,, 
Copernicus, Ippler, Newfcori ar.d Emstien btjcause thev tail-
about the same topu., namely cele-'stic-i 1 mechanics. Ptoli-~-my, 
Copernicus, I L'pler, Nt.'wton arid Em-.tein also represent as 
historical -seauehcr- of predfecessor and successor l-heories. 
tk?nc(-> we shall bf> intere'stsd mciiniy in comparirig two 
theories tri.nt are intuitively about the same topic, where 
one theoi^ > JS the historacal successor- of the other tteorv. 
/I s 
"here ai c, of CDur~,e, many ways jn whach bheoi-^ ieH. inay bp 
compared. We CDuld CD.Tipare the number of noblo laureate's who 
Nave advocated their IheorieB oi we may compjare two 
uaiiCiLU-J jjariies in our (-ountry. It in noL these iioi t of 
compariBons wc af^ e interested jn. nor it I'c these sort of 
comparisons i-uMn =a_/S aru impossible when he claims that 
"heories are incommensurable. 
.Lii fact we 3.r-e interested to accept a more rational theory 
or the basis of cofnparison out of two r^val thiecries. We ans 
..o'lcei-ned hert^ only with those- aspect.", of r^  theor^y which are 
rciov'anfc to scjentific ra t lonal ii> . T^ lUG tu understand Lht-> 
ncommensui ab L11 ty th.^sjs we mu^t undersb-\nd what s.-.ientific 
rationality is"' One problem is that there are a<- many views 
aw what scientific rationality is as there are ph3 1 cjsophers 
of science, but we shall attempt to piovide hei e an c-'er 
/lew of r>ume of the main issues about srient^fic 
rat Lonalj t>. 
Ei^'aJ L'at m y the yoais o* science ejiiiibits addational 
d J f f icul t les „ Does science have a sxriyle goal"' [f so, what 
I ou i d it be"' Wt-:? could say that the singla yoa i of science JE 
to pro/ide a true picture of the worJd. This seems to be 
3nadequate« B> simple andut-tive general izat 3 on we can 
conclude that nn scientific theory has met this goal. All 
tlteories of fclie p-H'-b have ueen rejecbed, therefore, thf-
theories o-^  the present may also be rejected = Providing a 
tf'ue pirture uf th^ ? world rsiay be one of the goal of scxenreM 
Ue learfi nothing aboat how well theories so far have 
achieved the goal. If ue say insbead the goal of science i <3 
D provide theories which closely acpro;;imabe the truth, 
bhen we face tbie difficult icx^i of measuring approximation 
to the truth,, And in art/ case all this assumes that any goal 
u3f science is to be c heracterired by fct-utn. Let us suppose 
that we can agree on the goals of science, and agree on the 
standard of rationality. Given then the phi lc>sopher, 11 I-e 
the scientist, mi.st i now how bo gauge Lhe passirsg laiidmari-'•^  
on the way- We mu-.t 1-now what no'-'t oi evidence we should 
erpec t in scientific mciujrv, and what iL signifies. 
^uhn's incommensurabi 11 t_y thesis holds that those aspects of 
scientific bheof les relev'ant fco deciding scientific 
lationality are not comparable. What this means depends on 
wnat we tai-e scientific rationality tc be. The preceding 
discussion IS intended to show that whatever the answer to 
t h : & q u e s t i o n T . i gh t btr , i t w i l l depend on t l-tr 'ee t h i n g s s The 
c o a l s oi zaencB^ t h e m e t h o d s o f t c j e r . c e , and t h e e v i d e n c e 
a v a i J a b l e i n s c i e n c e , , I i ihn t a l - e s f-ach s c i e n t i f j c theo i^y t o 
be one p a r i o f a g e n e r a J oa i -ad igm supr - 'Or ted by member'''- o f n 
^ s c i e n t i f i c r o i n m u n s t y . Thus I ' u h n ' s t h e s i s says t h a t the* g o a l i ; 
o f one p a i a d i g m are ' n o t c o m p a r a b l e t o t h e Q c a l a o f a n o t h e r 
p a r a d i g m , o r t h e meth'tdF, o f une p a r a d i y m a r e r i o t c o m p a r a b l e 
"o t h e m e t h o d s o'f a n o t h e r pa i^ad igm oi^ t h e e v i d e n c e s 
: ^ v a 3 l a b l e m one p a r a d j g m a r e n o t c o m p a r a b l e m t h e 
( e v i d e n c e s a v a i l a i j l e m a n o t l i o r par^ad igm. 
"•"wo f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n s mu<=:t be anst-vet ed t o r i s r ^ i f v 1-uhn' s 
t h e e i s , , When I-uhn <-jay<i t h a t I h e c r - i e e a r e i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e , 
d o e s he rusari that any two t h e o r i e s 3.rB i r iCommerisurablG-
b e l o n g I I iQ t o d i f f e r e n t p a r a d i g m o r o n l y th<^t some t h e o r i e s 
ai e i nco .Tmen%urab le w j t h i r ? a p a r a d i g m " ' S e c o n d , is.> 
inc fDmrnensurab i L t t y a lways , coinf)le->te, o r lu t h a t t h e o r i e ' - . arfc 
p a r t i a l l y ir icommen s u r a b i t - w i t h one j n o b h e r . F o r f i i c t 
q u e s t i o n [ u h n h o l d r t h a t t h e c r i e s a r e incoi"nmtn'--;ui-able 
bpcause. p t i r a d i g m s arL^ i n r o m m e n s u r a b l e . , Two p<-irad igm-"- d u n e t 
b h a r e even g o a l s , i ne thod and e v i d e n c e o f scit-"'nc e . He 3eem<-„ 
t o c l a i i i i t h a t wher ieve r a s c i e n t i f i c f e v t ^ l u t ^ o n occur?-. , t h e 
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the'-jrie-i: Deforfc -^ncl at" Lei- the rc-v'olutjDn are 3 ncommensurable 
wi th one anothe i - . Henre,, 5C j en Lif 1 c t h p o r i e s acrc^ss t h e 
parcidicim r^re xn{:omiTiensu'--Ab] c . However, he n e v e r <3ays whe-ther 
or riot tnecii-> change a lways r f -quares ^ a s c i e n t i f i c 
I '&' . 'ol i . i i", i o n „ 
Moreover, some thenrie'^:i ai-e no t incommensurable b e c a u s e they 
are t h e p a r t or pa rad igm. In answer t o t h e second ques t i on . , 
p h i l o s o p h e r ' s g e n e r a l l y assume t h a t !• uhn c l a i m s t h a t when 
b h e o r i e s are j ncommensurab J e , the^ are cc^mpletelv 
mcommerisurab l e . 
ITI The iiltructLU'e or S c i e n t i f i c F.i^valution Kuhn h o l d s t h a t s 
"Ther ' e fore , a t tames of r e v o l u t j o n , I'^ hen 
the normal s c i e n t i f i c t r a d i t i o n c h a n g e s , 
t h e s c i e n t i s t s p e i x e p t i o n of h i s 
e n / i i o n m e n t must be re-ec jucuted in some 
f a m i j j a r =:ituatiori& he must l e a r n to s e e 
a new y t s t a l t , , A l t e r he hac done so t h e 
world of h i s resec-^rch wilJ soem, h e r e anci 
t h e r e , i ncommerrsui'.\b l e wi th t h e one he 
1 
had i n h a b i t e d befor^e" . 
•^ hus tne may ta^ -e the final s'ercian of Puhn's 
3 licofftmensurab X 1J ty t-hesis as; 
For some pair of theories, Tj and T2, 
Buch that Tj c.,\d T^ -sre about the aamf 
trjpic and where one of Tj: and T2 i» 
pre-decessoi^  theory and the other is 
successor theory, there will be a 
paradiom associated with T| ana a 
different paradigm associa-ted s^ ith T2 
such that the goals of one paradigm will 
not he completely nomparc-ble-' to the goals 
of other pai^ ada gni,; or the method of one 
pctradigm wi J ] not be completely 
comparable to thf' goals other paradigm, 
or the eviaence available in one paradigm 
will not be completely compai able to the 
evider^ce availablt; jn other paradigm"' 
What IS the argument that BupDorts &uch a thesis~' To begin 
N3-th„ let us rp>c(jnsider the logical posifcivist model of 
theoi-y comparison and consider pi-ecisely hiow I-uhn would 
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argue aginst it„ On Nagel's view, theory comparison is 
primarjiy a comprtrjson of evidBnc(?s« The QO^ *is and methods? 
of science are net important. Given Mage] 's accuuiit of 
theory comparison, ib is clear that he hold that the goel of 
science i?, to provide trxie the^oriee of the world.. 1 hey 
achieve this goal to such an eutent that they male more 
predictions. So according to Nagel, predictions are one of 
the mam evidenti'.il bases for theory comparison. 
He identifies two types of theory reciuction, homogene-^ ous an'J 
hetrogeneous. Homoqenerfus t^eduction applies when one theory 
IS shown to be a branch o1 a b^  oader theory. Because 
descript i\'e pi-edirate<-3 are t-ssent lal iy the same between 
homogeneous theories. Nagel does not regard homogeneous 
tiieory rf-'duction as; problematic, ft is the hetrogreneous 
theory reductjon, whichi sliows disparity in descriptive 
predicate's emp],iyed in the two tlieories to which he makes 
comparison. 
As Nagei says that +irnt the formal conditioris must be met 
for the form o+ theory reduction. Ail of the a,(iams, special 
hypotheses and e.;per j ,T?ental laws ot both theor-ies must be 
a-'ai lable as formulated statements. Furthermore, the 
meanings of all constituent ter^ ms of these aitioms, special 
fiypotneses, and £?\per imental laws must be clear. 
1 he structure of theories that Nagel proposes is t/pically 
positivistic, consisting of theoretical postulates, derived 
Iheoi-ams fi^ om these posiulabes, laws gove'Tung e;;perimentel 
situation, curr^espondencs rules for interprstmg tne 
theoreijcal postulatt'S and theorams, and observat luna i 
statements wrach constitute data to be explained. When the 
two theofjes are homogeneous, then one is reducible to the 
others if its observational results are derivable from 
other , 
When theories are hetrcgeneous, then one must provide 
additional assumptaon that act as au.-!3]iar> correspondence-' 
rule<--, not between the theoretical and obaerva fcion statemesnt 
but bF^ twetin the iheoretical state-ments o1 each theof _y, for 
all statements in each theofy that employ terms not occurinu 
jn the other theory. If the observational results of one 
theory are derjvable frcjm the obssrvatloria! results of the 
othei , then the former theory js ,-educible to the latter. 
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Ewsn on the' basis of what we have psesenbed an i-uhn' s 
po<53tiDri earlier, tnere art? '">everal objectian'is HCuhn would 
raise to NaQsl sr view. He might first of all deny that all 
the aMoms, special hypotheses, and e,!peri(nental laws of 
each theory are es-plicitly statabJe. If they are not. Lhen 
rlagel's nece^ssary conditions have not been met, and theory 
reduction is not possible. Perhaps all of these elements arn 
P(4i"t of what: I uhn calls the symbolic qeneral i;:ation of a 
paradigm, and ate in fact e,\p}jciily stated. Nagei turther 
i^ equires that the meaninrjs of all the constituent terms be 
fined and i-uhn would deny thzit they ar^ e. The meaning of brth 
theoretjcal and observational tor-mb are determined iri part 
not by definitaons, but by e;,emplar-„ E.-;amplars are not 
e plicitly statable, nof are they mterpi eted in the same 
Wriy by dll scientists oven of a given scxentitic commuriity 
hence the meaning of terms is not absolutely fi;;ed. Thus 
I uhn would dt-ny that the necessary conditions to check for 
dc-uu vabi 11 by of observatiori :^;tatements ai^e fulfilled. 
In addition, I-ui'in would ques-tion whetlier any apparent pairs 
of homogeneous theoric-s a'-e in fact homogeneous. 1 tihn 
continually points out that just because Newtonian and 
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EjnsLsnjan mechanics botn empioy the Lerm mass' does not 
mean that the same concept or 'mass is employed by both 
theories. The mere tact that two theories employ the same 
descriptive terms dc^ es not show that they employ the same 
descriptive concepts fcf" instance 'mass' is absolute and 
relative term m Newtonian and Einstenian mechanics 
respectively and hence does nctt show that they are 
hamoQeneous« 
Finally I-uhn would deny that we can mal-e the assumptions 
that would be necessary to br idcje cheoi'^ etical ber^ ms in one-
theory to the theoretical terms in ariother theoi y. It is 
fuhn's reasoning on this pnjnt that is most important and 
provides the ley to under-itand how he could critici»:e jiist a 
particular^ account of theory cnmpor isori-, 
Ti-^ ansJ at ibi 11 ly ; We ha'/e ali^ eady seen several important 
claims that I- uhn has made, f-'or the cases we are concerned 
with, two different theories will be part of two different 
paradigm. Consequently, they will be stated m two different 
Janguages., Fven the observational lanyuages of theories will 
not be the same. Primae T^ c le, the problem of theory 
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comparison should be understood in terms of proble/n of 
translation,. We may call it transla tib 11 ity» If there will 
be a theory neutral observataon language, thpn the probl&m 
of translation iTiiqht not be a problem ab all. But we have 
already seen powerful argumeribs 1 rom contexual ists such as 
I-uhn, that there is no such thieory neutral observatian 
lanyuage. We f,houid now to consider what we mean by a 
theory-neutral language. We mean a language that is neutral 
witti respect to all theories and sliares hy all theories. 
Tl-)ere v-\re two questions. First, can translation be done 
directly with cippeal to the medjum of some third shared 
language' This 35, how we translate LSrdu into English, 
English into Hindi etc. Second, if the medium of some shared 
language is needed, must it be neutral with respect to ail 
theorjes oi two theories to be compirired" There is no theory 
noutral obsei vat a on language in general it does not 
immediately follow that there is no language wh^ch is 
neutral to thtri theories to ha comparted. 
Why IS it that we can mat r- direct translation between Urdu 
and Engliiah"' We can directly translate because though Urdu 
and English use different terms, and even different 
grammers, they do not use cljfferEnt concepts. We consider 
then different languages but not different conceptual 
schemes. Different paradigms are not liie different 
languages f uhn states: 
in a sense that I am unabif? to expljcaite 
further, the proponents of competing 
paradigms practise their trades xn 
jjif-ferent worlds. One contains 
constrained bodies Ihafc fail slowly, the 
other pendulums that repeat thexr motion'^ 
again and again. In one, solutions are 
compounds, m the other mi'itures. One is 
embedded in a flat, the other m a 
cui-'\ed„ mr-iti-^i;; of space. l-'iactismg in 
djffei-ant worlds, thy two groups of 
scientists set' riif + eient things when they 
looi- from the same point m the same 
direction. Again, that is nob to sav that 
ihey can see fmyth.ing they please. Both 
are looting at the wnrid, and what the> 
look at has not changed. But m some 
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Areas the. ' -ze^j d i ' f f c i ' e n t fchincjS, and t h e y 
s(^o them jn d i f f o r t - r i t reLalJ.Gn£> one t o 
t he other . . '^ 
iJhar, 1-ithn r. m p o s s i b l y moan here when he c l a i m s t h a t 
i c i e n f c i & i s m di f f r^ i '^ent paf^odigms pi nf t i r . e xr, d i f f e r e n t 
frsiiK-^ Mat I s and y e t t h a t thoy a r i - ball in( j al^out the same 
wcir id &nd hence d i f f e r e n t pai-ad i gois r e p r e s e n t d j f l e r f c n -
cnncepluaJ schi-mes. Thi-s prob lem o? t i an..^latiQn xs no t ius~c a 
p i c b i e m o-f de t6"-rmin incj the r e i a l i o n he-twtseii Lht? terms, and 
cuncapLs,, I'ach t l i e u r y usei. conc^^pts t h a t a r e ur . iqus t o x t£ 
pai ad LQiii. Consequan-i l y tran^sla t j on v* 111 have t o be done 
thiroi igh what i s sharc-d bettiet^n the two parachgnis. T h i s 
=jhared t h i n g i=, p i - e r i s e l ^ what we mean VMhen we speat o f s. 
i j i i r d , n e u t r a l 3arguat jp. rhu.= d i r e u t I r a n - J a t i o n w i l l no t 
worl- „ 
J J tl~iere a lani juage which i s n e u t r a l w i t h re^spect t o t he two 
i rieo' it?s which s u f f i c e to mal-e theof^y compar ison p o s s i b l e ? 
Wr- ifiust cnnsKJer wriac we mean by n e u t r a l Ictnguage. 'NC'UtraJ ' 
iz, a v ' u i u a t i v t t e r m , and we mu j t asi n e u t r a l w i t h resp6.*ct 
t ( j what "' 
A bfieory neutral observation language means a language which 
IS epistema cal ly neutral. In oLher words, a tfieory-neutral 
obsei-vation language would be one whose statements are not 
iiiterprei ed, they are H'ere factual repor tings-
We must also recoyntse that in giving up a general theory-
neutral observation language we Are making an episfcemic 
concession to the tlieories. If the results of two theories 
c ,in each be restated in a gp^ nef al neutral observatuion 
language, we are getting then the factual content of each 
tiieory. Hence we compare the theories against an established 
epistemic standai'd our judgement then that one theory is 
superior tho other. 
Can there be a neuti-al language that serves as a medium for 
translation between two paradigms"' i-uhn replies in negative 
and to understa\nd his reasons we must understand his 
metaphof in saymg that scientists in different pacaaigfn 
piactrise in diffcM'erit woi^ lds which n'^ different conceptual 
f rameworl- s. 
Th'.^  pf^ obJem is not just one cf translating between languages 
that do not srsai^ e all the same concepts. The problem IF that 
Lhe mearung of some of the diver yent concepts is understood 
by e'emplar not by defj ration and hence formal tran'-ilation 
pruceedures that operate on statable statements do not worl-» 
A<j ! uhn says; 
Sofifiethng 111-e a paradigm is pre-requisi te 
to percept J on iteelf„ What a man '~,ee^ 
depend<5 both upon what he looi s at and 
also upon what his pi--evious visual-
conceptual e)!periencs has taught him to 
seem. In the dbsence of such training 
thc?re can only be, in William James's 
phi-ase, "a bloomin', buznin', 
confusion""'. 
It js in the sense that an understanding of the wor 1d by a 
sceintist depends upon the paradiym in which he worl<s. 
Theories stated in different paradigms are not translatable 
in the fol lowing senses. They are not dii^ectly translatable 
+ram one language to another, as we translate Urdu to 
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English. Moreover, they a''e not translatable through tne 
triedium of somt^  third language which is commori to both 
paradigms. "ff-^ nslation of these ! mds fails because a 
paradigm 3 5 not just a languacje, it is a conceptual scheme,, 
To say that a scientist belongs bo a paradigm is not just to 
•>ay that he shares with othef scientists of his community a 
common Janguage of science, but that he shares a common way 
ui viewir.y the world which is unique to that of 
oaradigm.. A conceptual scheme is not based an techniques for 
interpreting e;',perience, but on that fact some fully 
conceptualized s.iperiences are direct, and not interpreted 
or infes-red. It is the ability to see a table,, and not ju<r,t 
infer that a brown rectangular smudge is a table, that mai-es 
Janyuage m general and hence ar.-y particular language 
possible. In the larigunge of scaenre statements are oi 
higher comple;;ity than "Thab is a table" that have this 
basjc and direct character. In science it may be statements 
such as 'that is an elect^on' or 'that is a photon . That 
ar'-e equally direct far a particular scientist,. No infc?rence 
occurs. It is simpiy part of how he has learned the Janguage 
of his science that sanctions such assertions iii the right 
con be,'t. One could asl , 'How ao you !• now that is Fhr^ton"' 
and per^ haps: elicit some justi-*" i cat lan from the ccientists, aa 
a response. But the thi"ust of !• uhn s argument is bhat ^'he 
question need not elicit such a response. There will come ^ 
point when the scientist wall not reyard yt)ur question as a 
proper question of science. His only response then is more 
litely to be something Jil-e 'Go and tat e some physacs 
courses. These are the points an a paradigm where one hac:, 
reactied the limit of the statable, where what r^ emains is so 
basic that no explanation can be given. 
Logical positavi^tic account of theory reduction relies on 
comparing empn ical results that ars dei ivable trom each of 
the bheories \a be compared such an account fails for two 
reason*-. Firsb, certain formed conditions about stability 
ar.d fi,;ed meaning of terms fail to be fulfilled. Second., to 
mal'e a comparison of derived empirical results, we must be 
aple to determine which theoretical statements in each 
theor> BrB to be comoared, and we must be able to t^anelate 
from one theoi y to another, and by luhn's arguments this 
cannot be done. 
Guals and Methods; Consequeritly, much of the discussion of 
l-uhn's incommensurability thesis centres on how to solve a 
perceived problem of translation. Nevertheless, the 
incommensurability thesis touches much deeper 3ssue£., and 
trans]atibi1 it/ is only one problem. Whatis the value of 
derived empirical results, even if they were comparable"' 
Evidence fcr e scientific theory is one oi the elements we 
must consider in an account of scientific rationality, and 
it IS in a sense, a secondary element. We can judga Ihe 
vMorth of ev'idence if we ^ now the goals to bw achieved, and 
I he means to be useci to achieve those Qoals» Here we see 
another pranleivu Nagel lil-e other scienbific empiricists, 
assumes bhat scjentific th*-:•o^'lF»s tihare a common goal o 
common method, thus reducing the problem of rationality to 
the problem of comparing evidence. But it is also part oi 
l-uhn's thesis Lhat the accepted goaliH, and accepted method, 
c^re not universal in science but paradigm Dependent, 
To e;>plain how methods and goals between paradigms may be 
not comparable, uet us coivsider the deveiopmerit of celestial 
mechanics at the time of copernjcus and review briefly the 
ztate of ptole^maic ac>tronomy prior to him. 
The accepted view from the time of Arictotle until the time 
of Copernicus was that the Earth stood at the centr of the 
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universe, and that all others celestial bodies orbited the 
Earth in circular paths, with the planet nearest the Earth, 
and the stars on a more remote celestial orbit. The two most 
pres:-3iny problems faced by ancient asti-onomers were to 
provide a celestial basis for a worJ ing calendar and to 
4 provide for a celestial navigation. Towards these ends it 
was necessary to provide a framewori- in which the locations 
of the stars and planets could be predicted. However, 
prediction was a secondary qoal? it V43i^ important only as a 
means to the larger ends of constructing a calendar and 
conducting celestial navigation. 
The two most important celestial bodies for devising a 
calendar wefe tho 3un and the moon. The completion of one 
c/cle bv the sun around the eai^ th was tat en as the standard 
for a calendar vi^ai', and the completiijn of one Lunar cycle 
was taf.en as the standard for one ^.alendar month. The 
problem was to reconcile the moon's irregular cycle with 
that of the sun, to be able to relate months to y«-:>arH: 
systematically. There were difficulties: 
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The moon t.-'avels around the ecliptic 
fasler and less steadily than tne sun. On 
the avei-aoe it compjetes one journey 
thf ough the? Zodiac in 27 ' "' days, but 
the time required for any sinijle journey 
may differ fr^ om the average by as much as 
7 houri-."' 
The lunar cycle reconciling month and year WDuJd not have 
been problem for ancient aBtronomers if the length of the 
moon's cycle could be predicted with any regularity. 
However: 
Successive new moons ,-r\ay be separated by 
inberv£ils of either 29 or 3i! da>£, and 
only a comple;-' mathematical theory, 
demandsng generation of systematic 
Observation and study, can determine the 
length of a specified future month,, 
Thus much of the wori- of early astronoraors was to compile a 
generations oJd record of the moon to serve as the basis 
for the required mathematical theory. It toes' asti-onomers 
literally thousands of years bo des/ise a wort-able calendar. 
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iiBtronomerz, ettempt^ng to predict the movement of fchc£ 
pJanets faced another difficulty. Even the pianeb's apparent 
motion doea not fat into U<B model of circular arbit around 
bhe earth. Periodically, each planet would go into a period 
of retrograde motion, [t become necessary to postulate a 
more comple;. mechanism for fche motion of planets that there 
(Ajes a point on a carcJe whach orbited the earth and that the 
planet actually orbit about this point on a smaller circle. 
This cii-cle was called the epicycle. The most of the works 
of Ptolemy to copernicus Wi.-<s devoted to get some networl of 
cirjces that would perfectly match observed motion of the 
planets. Their efforts never fully succeeded; 
For its subtlety, flexibility,, 
rompie!!ity, and power, the epicycle 
deferent technique ... ridS nc parallel in 
the historY of science unti3 quite i^ ecent 
times. In its most developed form the 
systems of compounded circles was an 
astoundiny achievement. But it never 
quite worled. Apollonjus initial 
conception solved the primary planetary 
irregularities - retrogade motion. 
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varia-cian of brightness, alte'-^ ation m 
the time required fcr successive journeys 
around the ecliptic and it did so 
simply arid at a sti^ oi-e. But it also 
disclosed some residual secondary 
irreCjuJ a n ties. Some of these were 
e;;pl^ ined away by the more elaborate 
system of compounded circles developed by 
Hjpparchus, but still the theory did not 
quite match the result of observation. 
Even Ptolemy's comple;; combination of 
defferents, eccentries, epicycles, and 
equantes did not precisely reconcj ie 
theory and observation, and Ptolemy's was 
neither the most comple;; noi" the last 
version of the system. Ptolemy's many 
successui's tool' up the problem where he 
had left it and sought in- vain for the 
solutioi"! that had evaded him. Copernicus 
was still grapliiig wjth the same 
problem.'' 
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Planetai y astronomy represerited a unique pei-'iod in the 
history of science. It is perhaps the only time xn the 
history of science when detailed observation had teen 
madeover a pc^ jriod of centuries without producjnq any 
startling new results. New observations were only more 
accurate confirmations of oldei'' observations. What is 
important about this point is that by the si;;teenth centurv« 
The practical need tor a theory of celestial motion had 
vanished. 4^o mathemat 3 ca J theor/ was required at all to 
determine now long the ne;,t lunar cycle would be, or whai e 
venus would appear in the si-y on the following winter 
solstics. nnyone wno desired such information needed only to 
consult the tomes of tables that had been compiled. In this 
sense, then. astronomers who continued to worl on the 
Ptolemaic theory were not attempting to prov'ide a theory of 
the uni-nown, but a plausible history of what was already 
1- nown. 
Cnpei'^ nicus's discovery was to abolish the whole system of 
epicycles and deference and restore sjmpLe circular motion 
as the motion of thie planets. This was done by postulating 
that 3t IS the sun, and not the earth, that is at the 
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centre, and bhat the earth Doth rDtates on its a;ci3 and 
orbits' the sun,. Today this is perceived as the most 
revolutionary of copermcus's achievement« In fact whet 
motivated Copernicus to adopt this discovery was bhat he 
cDuid offer e completely dafferent account of retrogade 
motion which Wcis not an actual motion of the planet^ :^, but en 
apparent niotxon perceived because the earth and other 
planets move afc different velocities aind at different 
distances- fr'om bhe sun. l*Jhat is clear from the history of 
the time is that tbie edge, copernicus had over Ptolemaic 
system was his solution to the problem of i-ebroyade motion. 
A'^ -tronomers came to regard to his solution to the problem as 
a dettei- solution. iAihat as difficult to €^ ;>piain is why they 
regai'ded it as a better solution, and why they regarded 
solution 01 the problem of retrogade motion as so importa.nt. 
!• uthn would say that those wno accepted the Ptolemaic 
paradigm had differenb goals or different views about bhe 
importance of various goals, and that they accepted 
different methods from those wno accepted the Copei-nicu's 
paradigm. He wouJd further claim that the gnal-s and methods 
of the two paradigms were not entirelv comparable. 
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h uhn cent inisal ly -peals of the scientist finding his new 
paradigm ] nccmmensurable with his old or of scienx;ists from 
difffcreni pairadigai^  facing incommensurability of their 
vjew<b. While incommensur^aD 111 ty of this sort is indenieble. 
It IS qujte a different thing to claint that no one 
philosopher or historian can ma(-e the relevant cross-
paradigm comparisons. There is good reason to thini that 
compas-'irig evidence foi" a theory associatc-->d with one paradigm 
to evidence for a theory associated with a dafferent 
oaradigm is a problem e/en for the phiiosophor, precisely 
because of the sevc-'re linguistic difficulties. But it is by 
no meaiui cLer\i- that the same barriers to comparison e.tist 
when Jt IS the goals or the methods of theories in different 
paradigm we wish to compare. Let us consider one historical 
thesis about the Copernican i evolution, f-rior to Copernicus,^ 
the goals of astronomy as a science were bound bo 
theological and metaphysical ideals.. Apart from the 
practical goals of navigation and resolving ths calendar, 
there was a desire on the part of of the Catholic church to 
advocate a certajn view about celestial objects that treated 
them not as mere physical abjei ts, but as heavenly tibjects. 
FurtheroiDf-e, as a consequence of cerbam theoioQicai 
doctrines, it was necessary that the heavens be viewed as 
finite and bounded, and that celestial objects have a 
certain Qeometrical and mathematical perfection to bhem. All 
of these doctrines fourid their place in F'toicmeac system 
because cf the scholastic interpretation of Arastotie. 
If we try to classify the events surroundiriQ the copeM-nican 
revolution m 1-uhn's scheme for scientific revolut lonir, then 
we would place the publication of Copernicus s De 
Reyolutionibus Qrbium CaeJestium in 15^ 13 at the peak of a 
crisis stage for the Ptolemaic pai-adigm. The publication of 
Copernn-us worl- represents the point at which sufficient 
doubt has been raised about the Ptolemaic paradigm to allow 
as cofflpet Ltoi-s not just rival F'tolemajc theor^iea but rival 
paradigms as well. The period of revolution is effectively 
cJosod, and a new paradigm and new period of normal science 
begun, W3th l-eplei-'s developmerit of the ttiree laws of 
planetr'v motion. Consequently, those astronomers living m 
the time between Copernicus and I epler are a comple;-; ol new 
and old ideals about the goals of asti^onomy and its 
methodology. 
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Perhaps mare impartant1/, Capernican astronomers no longer 
felt the practical need to present an astronomical tneory of 
great accuracy. Celestial navigation and wori- on tht.? 
c.-ilendar would continue independent of the a©tranomical 
theorv, opei^ating on the strength of centuries lonci 
compilation of observations. 
Finally, and most important of all, Cop-ernican asironomei-^ s 
rejected tne F'tolemaic mebhodology, which required all 
theoi- izing to be done withjn the contf aints of a system of 
epicycles. Kepler did it succe=;sful ly, but he was nut the 
first to e^perument. The Copernican approach was that it 
opened up new restjacch possibilities in a field ti-.at had 
beeri aead for centuries. The asti-onomers weighing the 
F'tolemtHic against the Copernican solution to the problem of 
relrogade motion was lilely to be motivated primarily by 
this consideration: accepting the Cooernican solution showed 
the way to ci-'eative and innovative attempts to theorise 
about astronomy. Orie historical theory about the Copernican 
revolution might be summarized as follows: 
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F o%t-coperr.ican astr^onomers either did not shnw the 
suholastic mterpretstion of Aristotle ai> the only way to 
preserve the neevenly status of ue-lestjal bodies or 
e/entually abandoned considering ceJestial bodies as 
heav'enlv and treated Lhem as phvsical objects. Further, tliey 
ac^ nowlsdcjed that the practical need<5 far 3 theory of 
astronomy had changed, and that accuracy was less preH<=;in9 
a^ a goal,. Apai t f t om these diffef^ences in goals with their 
F'bolemaic counter-parts they also accepted a different 
•nethodolociy „ Rather than lollow a system that required a set 
of only ci I-cular motions, a system where genuine 
opportuii 1.13 e-'s for ceati'-ity had been de,ad for centuries, 
they accepted a inore liberal /lew about the Qeome^Lrical 
forms that couid appropra ateJ y be applied to astronomy. E^ ut 
this does not mate incommensurability about yoais and 
methods a general, at e/en a philosophical problem. The 
historical the = i;., we have presented which is a ^ery direct 
attempt to compare goal r arid methods of two difterent 
paradigms, could well be true. Further, its ti-uth depends 
riot ori phi 1 .JsophicaJ matters, but on historical matters- Ua 
phi losoph LcaJ issuen:) need tie resolved for uc to evaluate the 
historicaj thesis, itj resoiutior! would depend upon 
precisely the sort of debate that surrounds any histoi-ical 
iAtorl-. The questions are all empirical, not philosophical. 
There is a ^uhn's ai-yument tnat goals and methods D1 one 
paradicim are not comparable with goals and methods of 
another. It is one thing to point that that PtoJemaic 
iAstronomers treated celestial objects as heavenly Dodies, 
t^ het-23= astronomers after hepler by and large treated them 
as mere physical objects. 
It IS qtu te another thing to say that astronomers should 
have been treated or should now treat celestial objects ss> 
mere physical objects- We ara inclined to judge that it is 
Lopernicus and not Pbole-majc who held the rational belief in 
such mabtersa However we feel that the history of science 
has proved Copernicus right and Ptolemaic wrong. 
The discussion at the end of this Chapter is meant to 
illustrate that there is more to scientific rationality than 
simply qettmg the right answer. We do not thinl that 
Copernicus was simply lurk>, we thinl- that he had good 
reasons for his claim. 
To give a satisfactory comparison of the methods and goals 
of different paradigm, we would need standards of good 
reaisons that can be genpi-alised aci-oss historical conte.ct. 
fuhn s arQument on this point tales a form of challenge. He 
does no I: offer en argument to show that thef^ e can not be any 
Eiicn standards. Rather he has issued the challenge to 
philosophers to produce such siandardi. In their absence, 
goals and metfiods can be judged only relative to the 
paradigrti m wh3ch they occui-. Comparison in the form of 
comparison of theii^  merit IH impossible. The best that we 
can say as that each paradigm has the goals and methods 
mdependtint I > . 
Prouresss A final point worth considei inq i© that, in 
the face of hjs own arguments, how does Kuhn delend the 
claim that science does jn "fact progress"' This is, at fcer 
all, a thesis he is committed tos 
Why should the enterprise si-etched above 
mof e steadily ahead in v^ jays that, say, 
ctrt, political theory, or philosophy does 
not ' Whj, IS progress a pre~requi«>ite 
reserved almost «;,clasively for the 
acti/itie^, i^ie call science"' Ihe most 
usual answers to that question have been 
S denied m the body of this esBay^ 
s 1 i.'O s 
i-uhn'c first a-isi^jef LS that, in a serme, there is no an&wer. 
he i^ egards the assertion that science progress as 
tautolociOUB. Scierice is an exemplar far progress, it is 
paradigmatic uf what progress iss 
Part of the question is fcntirely 
semantic. To a very great entent the term 
"EJCj.ence" is reserved for fields that dc 
progress in ODY'XOUS ways. 
h uhn 5ugge<=ts that our motivation for wanting to define 
progress, ur define science, is not that the definitions 
tinemselves are so important: 
ine'^ it-sbl> one suspects fcnat the issue i% 
more tundsmental. Pi'obabl^ y que-'-stions lii-e 
the followinQ dr'e really being asi ed„ Why 
does my field fail to move ahead in the 
wa> that, say, phvsics does'' Whet changes 
ui techniqiie or method or ideoJog^ would 
enable ib to do so" These are not, 
however, questuons that could respond to 
lei 
an agreemant or, definition, rurthermore, 
3 •* precedent t rom the natural sciences 
serves, thfey will cease to be a source of 
corif.ern not when a definition is Toiind, 
but wheri the groupie that netv doubt tlieir 
own atabus arhieve consensu-s about their 
past and present accomplishments. 
Whilrt it IS cor tainl> true that practitioners of a 
discipiirie cease io worry about whal science ur progreos ii; 
once they hwve sc-ttied that their own discipline is in fact 
a science arid does in fact progresLi, this xs not reason to 
claim that the que^ -stions Lhat concern practitioners could 
not respond to an agreement on definition. If we can 
uriderstand what connects one par-adigm its successors, what 
it=, preserv'ed and carried on frorri one per tod m the histo!-> 
of sc leni e to the ne,;t, we will not only be i-eassui ea about 
the status of clear sciences such as physics and cnemjstry, 
but will be able to comment on less secure dssciplmes such 
£iS Psycho i cjcjy or 'Jociologv,, where t ristead the phi losophtei of 
Science must now ?11 tujo often i^ ema i n silent. We migiit 
eijpect I-uhn to argue that Science pi-ogresses just because 
thc-it IS the s o r t DT t h i n g j t i s , bu t t!-e P h i i o s o p h o i shcjuld 
no t he happy t o - f c t t i s f o r "::.urh a answei . I n one sense 
I-lihri s n r j t i on a f p r o g r e s s i s L h a r a c t e i i sed b_y t h e r e v o l u t i o n 
wh ich tai-e:-i o l a c F i n Or-tradign. s h i f t . T h i s i s c o n t r a s t t o t he 
l o g i c a l n a s i t j . . ] s t s on accoun t or progs-B=.IS m tei-m o f 
accumuJa l ion o f s c i e n t i f i c f-nowlc^dge, hence, m Kuhnian 
t e r m s , r c v c i l u t J on ' i s Lhe i n d i c a t o r c f^ s c i e n t i f i c g rowth 
which m poc-i ! ' i / i s t i c framewori- accLiiinu,] a t i g n i s t he 
j f i d i c a t c u o f grDw!"h in 3c3cnce„ 
In •L.onclu.-ion, w& i;ay t h a t !• uhn s argument f o r 
1 nc-omffiensLU ab i L1 t y li = s Lwo ma i n p o i n t s . F i r ' ^ t , t h a t e / j d e n c e 
f o r a t h e o r y assoc ia ted m t h one parad igm i& no t f u l l y 
comparable w i t h ev idence f a r a t heo ry a s s o c i a t e d w i t h 
ar ,other pa rad igm. The meaning o f te t m is dependent .n p a r t 
or. e, .emplars and mo(Jel=:, and i ience p a r t o f t h e mi=;aning of a 
t h e o r y r e s t s JO sn invsrt i c u l a b l e b a s i s . Thus t r a n s l a t i o n 
car.ni j t be done d i r e c t l \ . I t would hav£- be done t h r o u g h t h e 
in!r>dium o f some m u t u - i l l y shared concep t j ; . Howev-er, d i t fe i - ^en t 
P< »"' . , 1 ' . ' > ' ' ' J'(ages, bu I 
d i I ii-~rc.il I 11' , ' ' li o f I a d j c a l c o n c e p t u a l 
d J f f erence' i ! between pa rad i c ' < i ' - i^lj 
lu-
large set of mutually shared concepts to enable even an 
indArect transJation. Second while the goals and methods of 
orie paradiQfii can be compared to the goals and methods of 
another paradigm, ab least bo the ekbcnt that any historical 
comparisons i-^re possjble, there is a special pi-oblem tor 
fiia'f m g tht-se comDarisons as a basis tor judgement about 
scientifjc progr ir-S'.^. 
It i'i not s-'ni-'Ugh to be able to identify what the goals aixA 
nethnds of each paiadigm were, and to note how they 
differed. To determine scienti/ic pr agi^ ess we must also be 
able to make aii evaluation of these tjoals arid methods, i-uhn 
challenges pin i losophers to pi oduce epistemic standards that 
can be yenero*! . .'ea across historical con fee- ts lu order to 
i7di-e surh evcdnation'-,. 
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PN i i c5ophe r3 a re gcsnsral L> r o n r e r n e d w i t h undecs tand inc i af 
human I-riowledQi?. ' . r c i e n t i f i c !• nowledge is t ! ie be'_l SK'-mple o f 
!"iuman I nowledge. fhits on ths? one hand, i f any b ranch o f 
human l-nowledge i£ s a f e f> um char^ges o f f ^ e l a t i v i s m oi 
sub j e c t J. V J i>m, i t shou ld be t > L i e n t x f i c rnowledge* and on t h e 
c . th r r hand, i i ue want t o iindei-s.tarid t h a i mal-ei, anv othei-
branch af human . nowiadge o b j e c t i v e , we shcjuJd loo t fir^l t o 
fche mode] o f s c i e n t i f i c I nowiedyf-u T h i s is, w h f t man/ 
phii lo5opher=> o f s c i e n c e t h i r i ! - . 
I n c h a p t e r tiAjo, i^ e too l up the tasl- o f underc j tand ing the-
Mi-iturs o f s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s a c c o i d i n g t o p h i l o s o p h e r s o f 
s r iHhCc m the PO-.-11J V] s t t r ! . - i d i t i on which g i v e s us eii 
account o l i t s approach to s c i e n c e . The proposed approach t o 
Tc iance never succeeded an e^;p J awning the meaning o f 
t h e o r e t i c a l te^•'m5 as no t meei-ing the necessa ry c o n d i t i o n s 
f o r o b j e c t i v e i nowledge c i a i i i i s . To do so would f u r t h e i 
r e q u i r e rev i 'S ion o f c iM te i l a o f meaning and a r i c h e r account 
c;f o b s e r v a t i o n 'i fcatements« 
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Howeve:,-^  we see that some posxtivists, lake Hempel wei"e in 
favour of to allow non-empirical statements to play same 
roJe in BCienf-e when canjoine^d wa th theof'iesj that have 
enipirical content. There is also recognibion of the fact 
chat theoretical terms are not and should not be amenctble to 
cninplete, e-jpiicit de f in 11 j on.. There i= al',a some indication 
th^t Henipel and Reichenbach had an apprecition for' the 
holistic aspect of the? langur.Qe a-*" science. 
AT analysis of observation statements was not expected fron" 
Icyical pozritivism because there soem to bo no need for such 
?<-i analysis. The dynamics of theory change simply was not an 
issue. Only, Nagel addresses the concept of scientific 
procji-ess and his anal/SiS fot-usses on the nart csw concept of 
tlioQi-^y reduL fcion. 
One moy classify these problems into linguistic and 
epHstenuc concerns. Logical positivists had to accept that c;i 
f.ill analysis of the meaning of ttieoretical terms requirr-d a 
set of explicit dc-.^ finj tion. 
3 07 
"lh£ eoistcmic status of sci&ntific theories accofding ta 
Ic'Qical positl^'i^m 15 simply one large question mars „ It is 
clear iri the wcri- cf Lai-nap -and othoi e and in the wort of 
.'''Jagei th-it how the mei'it of a fcht^ory will depend upon the 
ob-ervationai consequences of the theor> . This view hiow&ver, 
teil-s us nothing about the ultimate status of observation 
ststemsnts.. Gn this l<•^ tte^  point logicaJ pDsitivi'->m is 
Eimply silent. ]t assume-'= that observ'ation statements 
constjbute a prisoleged class that Are =elf ou<£f ifymg, but 
this pusition jr. nt'ver actucilly stated. l"urthei the only 
acctJLsnt of cofTirtieni,urabi 131> depends upun the assumption that 
the ob^jsrvatjon language is fj;-;ed and reidenti flable from 
one tneor\ tc the ng;!t. 
In Chaptei-^  three we began to e ,pluin kuhn s criticism on 
posjtivism philosophy of science. Two important themes are 
intfoduced„ The fii'^ st tlieme challenyes the positivist 
account of thecsrjes and ptovides an accauiib of «ieaning. The 
secorid theme provides dynamic of theory change. 
Accoi-dmg fo r.jgicrtl posjtiv_Em, ci scientific tlieory 
consists of a set of symPoli.- garieral i zat ion, tied tc 
: iO: 
predictive consequences by statable correspondence rules. 
The LheoretiCcil termB utiJizcd in theco gener^ al isat ion can 
be defined b> set of defxnitaons. Predictive consequenu.e3 
and definitions will be by and iai-ge m Dbservotlonai Sperms.. 
TiiiiTi structure dc^L'ts not pfXjvide neither a full account of 
tne "i anguatte of scier^ ce nor a full account of the epistemic 
bastS of <:3rienLe. 
I uhn held that de f init loriii on infinite regreijs or 
circulai itv must come to an end because it falls short of 
yivsng theorebical tr-rms full nieaning and the epiEbemic 
itatiis of theories cannot depend upon unei^plamed status of 
ut/sei^ vatioriai statemerits. Tiius a theory must be treated nob 
)ust an abstract entity buc also as one part of a iarc.er 
nt-twori of shared dcDC trine by a scientific community. 
It seems uleatr that logical positivasts ejspected that theory 
lompai-'json to be an issue of cumulaS^iveness of scientific 
i-nc3wledge or showirKj how oidef^  the^ t^ i-ies are sudsufufad as 
special case-'^  of thieir successors or atieast showing how all 
predict! v'e results of older thooi les can Dc reproduced by 
their successors, fuhn, however is adamant in arguing that 
10" 
de\eiopmsnt of science doe= not follow this buxlding blocl-
model. i-\e stt^tches a picture of ihe nistcu^ y of science as= t^ 
series of disconLinuous jumps, where one paradigm and the 
embedded thearv associated W3fch it, is replaced fully by 
diiother Daradi^m. As iar as the question of comparison of 
scientific tnec!"ies is concei ned, I uhn held that a chancji^ -
m paradigm means also a change in language. He does argue 
that theories are incommensurable arid ^hus non-compsi ab le. 
In Chapter four, we pi^esented I uhn s ai-gument. The orimary 
ques!:;ion of this chaptei-" 3S what is the basis of saying that 
theoi les c^ annot be compared, [• uhn argues that the meaning of 
scientific t6->rm<= of theories acf^ oss the paradigm are 
djstinct and different paradigm not only use different 
language but slso belongs to different conceptual schemes. 
This IS a genei"al reason that he claims that we cannot talk 
ot the empirical result of Ofje theory being reducible i,o be 
fmpirical result of another. 
-is far as goals and methods of paradigm are concerned, I-uhn 
held that th(?re is no common standard for Campari ng them and 
hence each paradigm has the gosls and method mdeper.dently. 
llu 
In nat s;heils l-.uhn argued that established theory reaches a 
Doxnt G"^  crisis where numerous anomalisB are not resolveable 
b\ it„ Consequently variou-a:, rival thear,ie& get attention and 
are consdered serinusly which may have been lurkincj in the 
bad.- ground foi" &ometinie„ These theories can not be 
compared because they use terms in differnt meaninQis and 
hence theories are incommensurable. One of the r::val 
tlieories over^bhrows the current bheory when it resolve 
those ainomalies more successfully. His views on non-
comparability and non-translataoi 1 i ty ar^ e directly linked to 
his not 1on of incommensurabi11tv. 
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